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Dates of the Annual Meeting 
 
A Reminder: The annual meeting of the North 
American Paul Tillich Society (NAPTS) will take 
place all day Friday and Saturday morning, 22–23 
November 2013. The banquet will be held on Friday 
evening at a local restaurant. This year, the Annual 
Meeting of the American Academy of Religion 
(AAR) is in Baltimore, Maryland, 23-26 November  
 
2013. In addition to the annual meeting and banquet, 
there will be sessions of the AAR Group, “Tillich: 
Issues in Theology, Religion and Culture.” Our 
President Elect, Dr. Duane Olsen, is the Program 
Chair of the annual meeting.  
Dr. Duane Olson, McKendree University 
dlolson@mckendree.edu  
The AAR Group’s co-chairs are: 
Dr. Russell Re Manning, University of Aber-
deen r.remanning@abdn.ac.uk  
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Dr. Sharon Peebles Burch, Interfaith Counseling 
Centre  
spburch@att.net 
 
New Publications 
 
Tillich, Paul. “Gibt es noch eine Universität?” and 
“Hochschulreform.” In Dieter Thomä, Hg. Gibt 
es noch eine Universität. Zwist am Abgrund—
eine Debatte in der Frankfurter Zeitung. (Kon-
stanz: Konstanz University Press, 2012): 16–36. 
 
Rittenhouse, Bruce. Shopping for Meaningful Lives: 
The Religious Motive of Consumerism. Eugene, 
Oregon: Cascade Books, 2013. 
Dr. Rittenhouse shows that consumerism functions 
as a religion. It provides a means of assurance that 
an individual life is meaningful. Because we need 
this assurance to live out our everyday lives, con-
sumerism takes precedence over whatever other val-
ues a person professes—unless a person can adopt a 
different way to secure the meaning of his or her 
life. This interpretation explains how consumers ac-
tually behave. From the perspective of Christian the-
ology, consumerism is a wrong answer to a problem 
of human existence that should be answered by faith 
in Christ. 
 
Obituaries 
 
Raymond F. Bulman (1933 – 2013) 
Raymond Francis Bulman, professor of systematic 
theology and the philosophy of religion at St. John’s 
University in Jamaica, Queens since 1963, died at 
age 79 on March 23, 2013. It was just a week before 
he was scheduled to be honored for his 50 years of 
service to the school. His induction into the Ameri-
can Theological Society at Princeton University was 
also scheduled for March, but that event, too, had 
had to be postponed after he suffered the stroke that 
eventually took his life.  
 A long time member of NAPTS, Ray’s contribu-
tions to the Society and to his field were significant.  
In 1993 became chairman of the Seminars on Stud-
ies in Religion at Columbia. His 1981 book, A Blue-
print for Humanity: Paul Tillich’s Theology of Cul-
ture, was named an outstanding academic book by 
Choice, a library journal. Mr. Bulman also wrote 
The Lure of the Millennium: The Year 2000 and Be-
yond,” published by Orbis Books in 1999, and co-
edited three other volumes with his friend and col-
league, Frederick Parrella. These books include: 
Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Perspective (1994), 
Religion for the New Millennium: Theology in the 
Spirit of Paul Tillich (2001), and From Trent to 
Vatican II: Historical and Theological Investiga-
tions (2006). He spoke fluent Latin, Italian, and 
French, and could read ancient Greek, Hebrew, and 
German. 
 Born on April 13, 1933, in the Bronx, the son of 
William Bulman and the former Anne Doherty, Mr. 
Bulman grew up in that borough and in Fort Greene, 
Brooklyn. He attended Gregorian University in 
Rome from 1957 to 1960, and was a special research 
student at Oxford University in England in 1970 and 
1971. He earned a doctorate in the philosophy of 
religion at Columbia University from 1964 through 
1973. 
 East Hampton played a special part in his life. 
His parents had “a remarkable love affair,” Ray-
mond said, and East Hampton “was their paradise.” 
It was there, in 1974, that he met his wife, the former 
Carole Kasbar. They married in 1978. Although they 
lived in Fort Lee, New Jersey for the school year, 
they continued to spend their summers in East 
Hampton until 2002, when they built a home in 
Wainscott, Long Island.  
 They had one child, also named Raymond, who 
says of his dad “[He was] incredibly loving, wise, 
and good-spirited person, and an exemplary husband 
and an incomparable father whose depth of experi-
ence and insight enriched the lives of those around 
him.” 
 He was a great contributor to the scholarship, 
spirit, and good will of the NAPTS, and will be 
greatly missed by all of us who had the privilege to 
work with and know him. 
 
Roger Shinn (1917 – 2013) 
 Roger Shinn was one of the scholars who stud-
ied with such theological giants of the 20th century, 
as Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. He was a 
great admirer and wise interpreter of Tillich’s 
thought, and provided lucid interpretations of both 
Tillich and Niebuhr. It was Niebuhr’s ideas that pro-
foundly influenced Shinn’s own ideas about Chris-
tian Ethics, a field in which he wrote a number of 
books. Colleagues and friends Robert McAfee 
Brown and John C. Bennett were also influential 
dialogue partners to Shinn’s contribution to 20th 
Century thought. A signal moment in his career oc-
curred when he wrote the statement of faith still used 
today by the newly established United Church of 
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Christ.  
 A truly gentle man, Shinn was always generous 
to his colleagues and students in sharing his ideas 
and supporting their work. He was balanced and fair 
in his judgments and not without a sense of humor. 
About the “God is Dead” movement he wrote, 
“Theology has always had a vested interest in fool-
ishness.” We shall miss his gentle and wise pres-
ence. 
Marion Hausner Pauck 
 
Edmon (EDD) Lewin Rowell Jr. (1937 – 
2013) 
Mr. Rowell was a graduate of Howard College 
(Samford University) and Southeastern Baptist 
Theological Seminary. Edd served in the U.S. Army 
(1954-1957) in Korea. He was pastor of churches in 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Ala-
bama before coming to Mercer University where he 
was a founder and Senior Editor of Mercer Univer-
sity Press. While at Mercer, he continued to serve 
widely as interim pastor of area churches. Edd Row-
ell was editor at Mercer University Press for more 
than 30 years. He was a dedicated Tillich editor and 
scholar and he supported many scholars, including 
many in the NAPTS, in their Tillich books. Marc 
Jolley of Mercer University Press says that Edd 
“loved every minute of his work.” 
 
Letter to the Editor 
 
Fred,  
I have said things like this before to others and to 
you but I want to underline how remarkable it is that 
that the Bulletin exists. I belong to many scholarly 
groups and each one has to figure out its basic 
glue—the bond that holds people together. Often 
enough it is a journal or a conference, but there are 
set ways of making those things happen and the 
leadership rotates by design. The NAPTS Bulletin 
exists, it seems to me, virtually solely because of 
your love of it and your dedication to the group. It is 
serious glue for this particular group and constitutes 
a remarkable record of scholarly contribution by 
you. I want you to know that this is how I feel every 
time the Bulletin arrives—astonished and grateful! 
So my hat is off to you once again.  
Wesley 
Wesley J. Wildman 
Professor of Philosophy, Theology, and Ethics, Bos-
ton University School of Theology 
(http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/) 
Convener of the PhD Program in Religion & Sci-
ence, Boston University Graduate School 
(http://www.bu.edu/drts/academics/religionscience/) 
Founding Director of the Institute for the Biocultural 
Study of Religion (www.ibcsr.org) 
Co-Editor of the journal Religion, Brain & Behavior 
(http://www.tandfonline.com/RRBB) 
  
Book Review 
Politics and Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary in 
New York, by Ronald H. Stone (Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 
2012), 486p. 
 
Reviewed by Guy B. Hammond 
 
veryone interested in the lives and careers of the 
two greatest American philosopher/theologians 
of the 20th century—Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul 
Tillich—will rejoice at the publication of Ronald 
Stone’s magnum opus, Politics and Faith: Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary. 
Stone’s personal connections with the two great fig-
ures, and his previous publications dealing with their 
lives and thought, place him in an unrivaled position 
to review their activities and interactions in the cru-
cial period of 1933 to 1955, when they were col-
leagues at Union Seminary. This work is a monu-
mental effort that sheds new light on their perspec-
tives, and indeed provides new insights into that 
whole period of American history.  
Central to both men’s experience in this time pe-
riod, especially given Stone’s focus on issues of 
politics and faith, was the inescapable impact of 
world wars, in prospect, reality, or retrospect. In his 
early pages Stone gives a prefatory glimpse of the 
two on different sides of the conflict in World War 
One, both falling into, and discovering the limita-
tions of, sanctified nationalism. Then, after Tillich 
had fled Germany with the advent of Nazism, they 
found themselves together at Union Seminary, con-
fronting the renewal of European conflict, and the 
need to find meaning in the midst of another world-
wide cataclysm.  
To what extent did they come to share a com-
mon perspective? Stone weighs the evidence judi-
ciously, acknowledging differences where they ex-
isted, but in the end portraying a remarkable overall 
agreement on issues of greatest moment. Despite 
E 
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tensions at various points, this agreement provided a 
firm basis for a broadly neo-liberal (not neo-
orthodox) theology in the post-war period.  
No review can do justice to Stone’s richly de-
tailed accounts of how Niebuhr and Tillich—jointly 
or separately—responded to the countless issues that 
arose during the period in question. A few selected 
topics may be taken as representative.  
Stone provides an interesting assessment of the 
socialism of Niebuhr and Tillich in the early thirties, 
noting that their most socialist books, Niebuhr’s 
Moral Man and Immoral Society and Tillich’s The 
Socialist Decision, appeared at the same time (1932-
1933). Niebuhr subsequently abandoned socialism 
and embraced Roosevelt’s New Deal, while Tillich 
continued to identify himself with his version of re-
ligious socialism, but came to understand that it was 
not “politically relevant” (74) in the United States; 
both could be said to have adopted a pragmatic, 
rather than a doctrinaire approach to economic and 
political issues. Stone shows how both sought to 
move beyond Marxism while preserving the benefits 
of a Marxist critique of society in Christian social 
ethics (85). 
Although it was Tillich who used the phrase, 
“On the Boundary” to describe his own circum-
stances in life and thought, Stone finds it useful to 
describe ways in which both Tillich and Niebuhr 
saw themselves in “boundary” situations. For exam-
ple, both stood on the borderline between theology 
and philosophy. Tillich was more overt in acknowl-
edging his vocation as at once philosopher and theo-
logian. Niebuhr was more critical of philosophy, and 
“turned more quickly to the biblical symbols” (79); 
but American pragmatism became more and more 
crucial to his perspective, not always overtly. 
Though German idealism was alien to Niebuhr, and 
pragmatism was deficient as an overarching philoso-
phy in Tillich’s view, both made use of existential-
ism (363). 
Before and during World War II, Stone sees 
Niebuhr and Tillich arriving at a remarkable una-
nimity of political perspectives. Niebuhr had aban-
doned his earlier pacifist leanings, and both were 
highly critical of Christian liberalism’s utopian ide-
alism. Together they constructed a “Christian real-
ism” that was relevant to the times. (Regrettably, 
Stone does not give extended treatment of Tillich on 
estrangement to parallel his masterful summation of 
Niebuhr on sin and salvation (120-132).) One of 
Stone’s narrations captures the flavor of the debates: 
Both Niebuhr and Tillich were asked, in 1943, to 
contribute to the work of the Commission on a Just 
and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of 
Churches. The Commission was chaired by John 
Foster Dulles, who was “a hardened proponent of 
the capitalist spirit.” Niebuhr must have smiled, says 
Stone, at the thought of Tillich writing for the 
Commission; Tillich’s perspective reflected his 
“sense of a world in revolt against the capitalist 
spirit” (154). Antagonism between the two and Dul-
les—who later became Secretary of State—only 
deepened in following years. Ultimately both sought 
to defend a middle way between “totalitarian abso-
lutism” and “liberal individualism” (185). Though 
they were close politically, Niebuhr “offered a more 
thorough defense of democracy,” while Tillich 
maintained that Western political forms were not 
necessarily transferable in totality to other parts of 
the world (185-186). 
In the post-war years, Stone discerns a certain 
degree of divergence between Niebuhr and Tillich. 
While Niebuhr continued to address issues of na-
tional and international politics, Tillich—with a few 
exceptions—pulled back from active political in-
volvement. His one major scholarly publication of 
the time that dealt with historical and political is-
sues, The Protestant Era (1948), pointed back to 
themes he had developed prior to World War II 
(263). Secondly, in other important works of the pe-
riod—in the sermons of The Shaking of the Founda-
tions (1948) as well as in the Systematic Theology, 
vol. I (1951)—Tillich’s doctrine of the Spirit became 
“very prominent,” while, says Stone, this theme was 
“almost absent in Niebuhr’s preaching and in his 
formal theological writing” (266). And lastly, of 
course, Tillich turned his primary attention toward 
the writing of his systematic theology, rather than 
being preoccupied with the Cold War and other is-
sues in the realm of social ethics. 
These divergences were real, but Stone is con-
vinced that they were relatively superficial, counter-
acted by continuing underlying common commit-
ments. In part to demonstrate this, Stone engages in 
a “social analysis of Tillich’s Systematic Theology” 
in a chapter entitled “Tillich’s Later Social Ethics” 
(289ff). Noting Tillich’s statement (in Volume I) 
that “it is not the task of the systematic theologian to 
set forth a political program or a social philosophy,” 
and that the system does not include a specific sec-
tion on social ethics (290-291), Stone observes that 
the whole of Tillich’s theology is written in dialogue 
with contemporary thinkers, not least with political 
philosophers of the time. For example, in the epis-
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temology of Part One, Stone mentions Tillich’s im-
portant citation of political philosopher Max Hork-
heimer’s analysis of “technical reason” (292). 
Though Part Two of Volume One (Tillich’s doctrine 
of God) is “relatively empty of social analysis” 
(293), it remains clear that Tillich’s ontological con-
cept of God is designed to provide a firm basis for a 
social ethics (293). Stone grants that Systematic 
Theology, Vol. II, is “except for a few references—
apolitical” (294). (Tillich did not engage in the more 
recently prominent debates about Jesus’ relation to 
issues of politics and empire). Regarding Volume 
III, the dominance of the Spirit (along with mysti-
cism and ontology) evoked Niebuhrian criticism 
(tradition has it that Niebuhr said regarding Volume 
III: “he’s even more heretical than I thought he was” 
(295)). On the other hand, however, the concluding 
section of Volume III “contributed to the revival of 
the symbol of the Kingdom of God as a central sym-
bol for social theology,” a tendency not matched in 
Niebuhr, but seemingly a compatible supplement to 
his work; Niebuhr used the Kingdom of God symbol 
primarily as a “principle of critique” of other utopias 
(422). 
In summary, both Niebuhr and Tillich eschewed 
simplistic solutions to the problem of relating poli-
tics and faith. Stone writes: “Some interpretations of 
Christian faith are relatively apolitical, others almost 
totally political. These two lived and taught a vigor-
ous commitment to politics for the common good or 
justice, but with a Christian reservation about poli-
tics, and Christian resources for life beyond politics” 
(416-417). They both generally refrained from ap-
plying Christian doctrine directly to political issues. 
“For both Niebuhr and Tillich it is a more compli-
cated process moving through social ethical judg-
ments, political philosophy and then policy and 
party strategies” (419). 
Stone sums up his depiction of the two great 
thinkers’ complementary relationship in terms of 
love, power, and justice: “Niebuhr wrestled for years 
with the dialectic of love and justice. At last, he 
talked about it as Christian love inspiring the strug-
gle for justice utilizing power. Tillich provided a 
philosophy of love, justice, and power for Niebuhr’s 
more pragmatic synthesis. Niebuhr’s dialectic gives 
the push for the never-ending struggle for justice, 
and Tillich provides a rationale for their necessary 
relationship with each other and with power” (444). 
Stone’s Politics and Faith will stand alongside 
Richard Fox’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography and 
Wilhelm and Marion Pauck’s Paul Tillich: His Life 
and Thought as an indispensable source for knowl-
edge regarding the lives and thought of these two 
towering figures in 20th century philosophical theol-
ogy.   
 
Visiting the Paul Tillich-Archives at 
Harvard in April, 2013 
 
Cees Huisman 
  
Among the Tillich-experts and the adepts of the 
first hour, I often feel how the apostle Paul must 
have felt within the circle of the first disciples 
around Jesus. Paul called himself “one born out of 
due time,” a man to whom the Lord had appeared 
only belatedly. Something similar applies to me, be-
cause, confessedly, I myself have only been a stu-
dent of Paul Tillich for no longer than one year now. 
Of course, I knew his name and some titles of his 
works from the student-handbooks at University, but 
I had never seriously studied his theology before. 
The opportunity to delve deeper into his thinking 
provided itself during the two months of my study-
sabbatical in the Spring of the year 2012—a privi-
lege allowed to me as a minister of the PKN (Dutch 
Protestant Church). Although during these two 
months my reading of Tillich’s work could not be 
more than a first orientation, it was sufficient to di-
gest an impression of his special way of practicing 
theology. What struck me was the fact that he was 
confronted with the same questions as we are in our 
day, viz., how can the message of the Gospel be 
communicated, so that it is appropriately understood 
and can be relevant to people in their idiosyncratic 
situation in life, to their place in society, and, at the 
same time, can be meaningful to them in their indi-
vidual predicament. 
In an epoch when our Church (PKN) is going 
through a process of anxiously trying to present it-
self as a “missionary Church” in a modern society, 
we are confronted not only by the issue of trying to 
sustain the congregations as they are, but also with 
the challenge of planting new communities and 
seeding new “plantations.” While that objective is 
surely commendable, of first importance, it seems to 
me, however, is to find out the precise questions and 
prejudices people are wrestling with these days, be-
fore the Church may provide any possible answers 
and solutions. So, I discovered for myself that the 
“Correlative Method” of Paul Tillich’s theology is 
still a valid approach for an accurate understanding 
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of the current topical situation in which people find 
themselves. Before anything else, this method of 
correlation deserves to be brought forward with the 
aim to clarifying the contemporary situation.   
After studying a handful of sermons and articles 
by Paul Tillich during the aforementioned two 
months under my Church sabbatical, I put my find-
ings in a report, entitled “Adieu, God!” My booklet 
makes an inquiry into the background and the rea-
sons for the contemporary phenomenon of the so-
called Apostasy and the Farewell-to-God attitudes 
shown by many people—subsequently followed by 
their conversion into Agnosticism and Atheism. 
“Adieu God!” also investigates the (missionary) re-
sponse to this phenomenon by the churches. These 
two required my consideration whereby I took a spe-
cial interest in the response written by the Theolo-
gian and Philosopher Paul Tillich (1886-1965).  
My growing enthusiasm with regard to his way 
of thinking, his interpretation of the Scriptures, and 
his ability to point out and to overcome different 
sorts of stumbling blocks, have led to my becoming 
a member of the Dutch “Paul Tillich Genootschap” 
(Society). Together with a few other Tillich support-
ers, we read and discuss some parts of his works. 
Once every six or seven weeks in the 2012-2013 
semester, we dealt with Tillich’s Systematic Theol-
ogy III. For myself, I am very impressed by his ser-
mons in particular. In order to show the importance 
of them, and for the benefit of others, I have also 
translated some of the sermons into Dutch, which 
can now be more widely read on my website. 
At some point, I discovered the Internet publica-
tion of the complete Inventory of the Paul Tillich-
Archives (b MS 49). This widely comprehensive and 
extensive collection of papers, notes, lectures, per-
sonal documents, etc., produced by Paul Tillich 
spans the period 1894 until 1974. It is archived in 
the Andover-Harvard Theological Library in Cam-
bridge, and it seemed to me an extraordinary occa-
sion to get acquainted with its contents, if possible at 
all. That possibility indeed manifested itself, be-
cause, quite unexpectedly, I received a generous of-
fer to stay in Boston/Cambridge for a few days to do 
my much wished for hands-on research. 
Long before my departure, I had been browsing 
the complete Inventory and so I had formed an idea 
for myself of what those 242 grey boxes were treas-
uring. Of course, I had to make choices and thus I 
confined myself to asking for “only” 20 boxes. As I 
have said before, I am particularly interested in Til-
lich’s homiletic work, but his reflections with regard 
to questions related to communicating the Gospel in 
a secular era have my interest and attention, too. I 
had made my wishes known in advance of my arri-
val to the archivist, Fran O’Donnell, and no sooner 
had I arrived than the requested boxes were present 
to be opened by me: I could immediately make a 
start with the viewing and browsing of all the se-
lected materials. 
On the other hand, our stay in the U.S.A. fea-
tured dramatic circumstances. We landed at Boston 
Airport one day after Patriots’ Day (April 15th)—the 
very day after the marathon bombing assault. And 
we left Cambridge on the day when the manhunt for 
the suspect was on the full alert (Friday, April 19th). 
Everybody had to stay in their homes—doors and 
windows locked. Boston and Cambridge were like 
ghost towns, with soldiers in full army gear and spe-
cial police forces thick on the ground and no public 
traffic at all. Fortunately, in the course of the day, 
we were allowed to leave for New York City to 
complete our stay in the United States. 
It was fascinating and exciting moment for me 
when I opened the first grey box, containing exe-
getical notes and sermons from the days when Til-
lich was a graduate student and an assistant preacher 
in Berlin. Tillich’s handwriting from that period is 
almost illegible to me, so I was glad to see typed 
transcriptions as well (boxes 16, 17). Further, I 
found in Box 19 “Das Neue Sein als Zentralbegriff 
einer Christlichen Theologie,” and the same box 
stored fascinating reflections on the authority of the 
Bible. The box revealed more interesting reflections 
on the essence and changes of the Christian Faith, as 
well as on novel ways to preach the Gospel. On ex-
amining Box 20, I was struck by a very interesting 
Easter sermon and two lectures on Christian Hope, 
whereas that same topic was also discussed in Box 
25, where I found “Eschatologie und Geschichte” 
and in another box “Eschatology and Personal Des-
tiny: Immortality, Resurrection and Judgment.”  
Another special topic in Tillich’s theology is the 
meaning of the Kairos-moment and his thinking 
about the relationship between time and eternity 
(Box 52). A remarkable document—in my eyes—is 
the report of a discussion between Paul Tillich and a 
few people about a sermon he had held on Psalm 90 
(Box 28). Very interesting too are the lectures by 
Tillich regarding the biblical sources of his theology 
as well as the address on the absurdity of the ques-
tion regarding the existence of God. Other docu-
ments profiling Paul Tillich as a man of faith and 
sincerity are the handwritten “A Revelatory Mo-
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ment” (for that matter, his later manuscripts are 
much more legible!), and Prayers, offered by him in 
various services and meetings (Box 63). My stay in 
the Library in Cambridge was too short to pro-
foundly examine the newly found materials. Unfor-
tunately, I got no further than an exciting investiga-
tion of what had come across my desk. So, I made a 
great many digital scans to be studied at home at a 
later time. 
I do not know for sure if all the found and 
scanned materials have been edited yet. In any case, 
it was a huge pleasure and a special experience for 
me to feel so close to the tangible sources of this 
particular theologian and to bring with me a treasure 
trove of copied manuscripts and documents. In my 
view, Paul Tillich was not only a systematic theolo-
gian, but also a systematic human being: I was im-
pressed by the scope and the order of his work. In 
my opinion, it shows clearly that Paul Tillich was 
not only thinking “systematically,” but also that he 
worked and lived in the same way. 
With gratitude to the staff of the Andover-
Harvard Library for their help, I will conclude my 
account now with my intention to carefully examine 
the relevant materials that I have brought home with 
me, in the hope that it will also benefit the 
church(es) in the Netherlands. 
 
April 2013 
Dr Cees Huisman, Meppel (The Netherlands) 
www.dsceeshuisman.nl  
__________________________________________ 
 
 
Political Theory and Theory of Religion: 
Beyond Sui Generis 
 
John Robichaux 
 
Editor’s Note: This paper was presented at the annual 
meeting in 2011 in San Francisco. 
 
Abstract 
 
The liberal democratic theories of John Rawls, 
John Courtney Murray, and the theonomous ethics 
of Tillich can be read as offering three different pro-
posals by which each seeks to bring the religious 
into closer relationship with the secular realms, typi-
cally described as distinct by classic liberal secular 
views of religious exclusion. However, recent work 
in religious studies (in theory and history) has also 
demonstrated the need to recognize the secularity of 
the religious—specifically, in the criticisms of a sui 
generis definition of religion and the numerous ex-
amples of the influence of the political in defining 
religious boundaries and practices. In this way, then, 
the paper takes up the “interpenetration” (in Tillich’s 
sense) of the classic, but inadequate concepts of the 
religious and the secular, and suggests the ground in 
the field is fertile for a further explication of this 
relationship between theory of religion and political 
theory, in particular.  
 
Key Terms: Religion; Democracy; Theology; Secu-
lar; Tillich; Murray; Rawls; Religion and Culture; 
Liberalism; Theory of Religion; Political Theory;  
 
Religion in Public Life 
 
Paper 
 
This paper seeks to bring together two disparate 
conversations concerning the relationship between 
religion and (secular) politics, each occurring simul-
taneously at the levels of history and theory in the 
literature, and both of which are challenging the sui 
generis understanding of religion, on the one hand, 
and secular politics, on the other. I argue that these 
two lines of inquiry have laid the groundwork for an 
improved theory about the relationship between re-
ligion and secular politics, and that Tillich’s theory 
of religion and culture may offer a useful model for 
developing an improved re-description of both relig-
ion and politics individually and significant dimen-
sions of their relationship to each other, even if some 
divergences and adaptations remain necessary. 
Historical projects are perhaps the most helpful 
in illustrating the fact that religious influence within 
the (supposed secular) political sphere persists 
throughout the eras and political communities com-
monly seen as marked by the various manifestations 
of secularism. In the U.S. context, for example, de-
spite constitutional, Jeffersonian, and Madisonian 
interests in, and assertions concerning, separation 
and non-majority domination, few historians deny 
that Protestant Christian mores and preferences have 
dominated much of U.S. political history, even de-
spite the objections of certain individuals and groups 
who would prefer that this influence had been, or in 
the future would soon become, even greater. For 
those who advance a normative position of secular 
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politics free from religious influence, this is vari-
ously seen as regretful, a lack of enforcement of the 
stated principles, even a noxious expression of ma-
joritarian schools of thought trumping liberal de-
mocratic ones, or some other form of deviation fal-
ling short of the secular ideal. Nonetheless, the clear 
historical influence of religion on so-called secular 
politics is undeniable. 
Meanwhile, the religious-secular debates con-
cerning religion and liberal democracy have by and 
large resulted in two camps, between inclusivists on 
the one hand, advocating (for various reasons) for 
the inclusion of religion in politics, and the exclusiv-
ists on the other hand, advocating (for similarly di-
verse reasons) for the exclusion of religion from (a 
presumptively) secular politics. Inclusivists often 
use historical examples, such as Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and Abraham Lincoln’s religious arguments 
(though not all of their arguments are religious, of 
course), to argue that religion can be beneficial to 
liberal democracy, and in some cases actually be 
more liberal and more democratic than secular lib-
eral democracy had itself been prior to these relig-
ious arguments affecting the public political debates. 
Meanwhile, exclusivists often rely on their own his-
torical examples, such as the religious arguments 
given by the Ku Klux Klan and Taliban (though not 
all of their arguments are religious, either), to argue 
for the necessary exclusion of religious arguments 
from the (rightly, in their view) secular political 
arena. I have elsewhere examined in detail two lib-
eral democratic proposals that may be helpful for 
getting liberal democratic theory beyond these two 
options of inclusion or exclusion, and instead offer a 
principled stance that can adjudicate the difference 
between the two types of religious arguments, be-
tween, so to speak, King and the KKK—that of the 
later work of John Courtney Murray and John 
Rawls.1 xxx 
Setting aside the hotly debated role that Murray 
ultimately carves out for natural law within the lib-
eral democratic legal realm, given his changing 
views on this topic at various stages in his career, 
Murray’s clearest means of incorporating the relig-
ious into the secular is through the well-known 
realm of civil society (not unlike Habermas’s early 
position concerning religion). Here, Murray stresses 
the role of religion in the non-political public dimen-
sions of civic life. This is the realm for religious 
authority and not legal authority. But it is also the 
realm where citizens’ moral and political pathos are 
formed, and the underlying philosophies that guide 
political principles are tested, debated and fully fash-
ioned. In this way, Murray proposes the religious 
can—and on his view, has the important role of—
affecting the (pragmatically secular) realm of the 
political, including law. Murray’s proposal is em-
blematic of a classic approach to religion being able 
to penetrate the secular through so-called civil soci-
ety (that is, the public non-political rather than “pri-
vate” arena), without tearing down the full distinc-
tion between religion and secular politics, as we in-
stead see with certain communitarian and wholesale 
anti-secular arguments. He seeks to preserve a dis-
tinct but not wholly separate role for each realm of 
public (and not merely private) life.  
Rawls, similarly, if very late in his career, also 
offers a path beyond classic separation models of 
liberal secular politics and religion. In his famous 
proviso, finally proposed in his 1996 introduction to 
the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls 
revises the classic liberal position on religious argu-
ments in the public political sphere. In the proviso, 
Rawls offers a fully permissive public debate, in-
cluding any religious argument, so long as the 
speaker is willing later to make the same arguments 
in terms of public reason, for purposes of public po-
litical justification. If this latter requirement is cor-
rected—using my modification that such reasons 
need not come from the speaker him/herself and/or 
Habermas’s observation that translation is always 
part of public deliberation and so is constantly nec-
essary, in any case, between various comprehensive 
worldviews, including religious to religious, relig-
ious to non-religious, non-religious to religious, and 
non-religious to non-religious ones—then Rawls 
offers an intriguing means of bringing the religious 
into the (previously presumed) secular public politi-
cal deliberation. He finally offers a widely permis-
sive deliberative phase and a restrictive justificatory 
stage, with justification (rightly, in Rawlsian liberal 
viewpoint) remaining on the grounds of the basic 
political principles. On Rawls’ proposal, then, the 
religious may very well indeed affect and influence 
the (secular/non-religious) realm of political justice.  
Both the historical example of Protestant Chris-
tian influence in U.S. political history and the theo-
retical work of Murray and Rawls are representative 
of many other available historical descriptions and 
theoretical projects which represent one well-known 
theory concerning the relationship between religion 
and secular politics—namely, that religion can de-
fine and shape (previously-assumed-to-be secular) 
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politics. Here, the influence is described in the direc-
tion from religion to politics.  
There are innumerable examples from history, in 
the eras and political communities not touched by 
the various forms of secularism, in which the politi-
cal shapes and defines the religious. Imperial Roman 
civic religion is one well-known example, where the 
political realm informed and defined the religious 
for various political purposes. In the ages of secular 
politics, however, there are also examples of the po-
litical (re-)defining the religious. There are myriad 
examples of previously-understood-to-be religious 
practices (and often central religious practices) that, 
for reasons precipitated by political action (most of-
ten law), were either altered or abandoned. Hallu-
cinogenic sacraments, certain forms of ritual blood-
letting and sacrifices, polygamous marriage, and 
wearing of headscarves are just some of the most 
well-known ones. In my previous work on liberal 
democracy, I describe such effects of liberal democ-
ratic political influence on religious practice, where 
the religious practitioner(s) do not revolt or reject the 
political arrangements outright, as liberal democ-
racy’s restrictive moment on religion.  
In addition to these examples of restriction of re-
ligious practice, I would also add the fact that the 
specific political context is able to positively (and 
not just negatively) define religious interests and 
even so-called litmus tests. This is particularly clear 
in the case of global religions, which are comprised 
of substantially different interests, emphases and 
even (presumptive) orthodox litmus tests across 
various political contexts—as with the various dif-
ferences between what constitutes Roman Catholi-
cism in La Paz, Beijing, or San Cristóbal de las 
Casas, just to take three locations I know from my 
own work. Here, I take for granted that religious 
practice is integral to defining religion for the 
scholar of religion, and specifically reject definitions 
of religion relying on Weberian ideal types, religious 
essences, or “official” teachings/positions, even 
when they are preferred by the religious practitioners 
(or centurions of orthodoxy) themselves. What it 
means to be Catholic, for example, in these three 
places differs tremendously, thanks to a large degree 
(though not solely) to the political context in ques-
tion. This is something we saw in this country with 
President Obama’s 2009 visit with the Pope, when 
certain U.S. Catholics complained that the European 
leadership in Rome did not do enough to challenge 
the President on his stance on abortion. As one sen-
ior Vatican journalist explained, this is because 
abortion is not a central Catholic issue in European 
politics like it is in U.S. politics.2 The (secular) po-
litical context matters to the actual practice of relig-
ion on the ground, this line of description explains. 
On the one hand, this observation is pedestrian (cer-
tainly for any sociologist or historian of religion); 
but for theory of religion, these differences, gener-
ated as they are by the greater social, cultural, and 
political contexts, are foundational. And they are 
particularly important for theorizing religion and 
secular politics, as they concern the very identity of 
a particular religious expression and practice being 
negotiated with the (secular) political. In the ex-
treme, if Sarah Thal’s argument withholds scrutiny,3 
for example, we may even see forces such as politi-
cal nativism create entire religions for political pur-
poses. Thus, the influence here is described as mov-
ing in the direction from the political to the relig-
ious.  
At the level of theory, I have in mind the now-
classic work of Talal Asad and Russell McCutcheon. 
Asad and McCutcheon, whose arguments are no 
doubt well known to most people in this room, go a 
long way toward describing the techniques through 
which secular politics define religion. Asad fa-
mously describes the redefining of religion neces-
sary for the coming into existence of the modern 
(secular) state. McCutcheon, having in mind as 
much the politics of the discipline as the politics of 
secular modernity, puts it this way: “The discourse 
on sui generis religion, then, can be understood 
as…a political program for constructing a modern 
social reality on the basis of a presumed difference 
between tradition…and modernity….”4 For his part, 
McCutcheon wants to normalize religion as a cul-
tural phenomenon, not distinct from the other such 
phenomena, returning it to, as he puts it “a branch of 
culture.”5 This, in fact, dovetails nicely with the the-
sis I am advancing here today.  
This thesis begins with this: in the two lines of 
thought sketched above, representing broader seg-
ments of historical and theoretical work in the field, 
we see that on the one hand, there is a line which 
describes religion’s influence on defining the (pre-
sumed) secular political realm, and there is also a 
line which describes politics’ influence on defining 
the (presumed sui generis) religious, on the other. 
What a comprehensive and coherent theory of relig-
ion and politics must recognize, I propose, is the 
fundamental insights of both these bodies of litera-
ture. If McCutcheon wants to place the religious 
within the realm of culture, then what I want to do is 
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(re-)place both religion and politics individually, and 
the dynamics of their relationship, in the realm of the 
cultural. And like many other areas within the realm 
of the cultural, they have substantial and essential 
effects on each other’s very definitions, and not just 
tangential elements. Religion and politics are, I pro-
pose, properly understood as often mutually defin-
ing. The relationship may not be circular, and the 
particulars of their interplay may unfold over gen-
erations, but religion and politics are not mutually 
exclusive or sui generis. The impact of one on the 
other does not run in one direction (for example, 
religion influencing politics or politics influencing 
religion), and, of course, they are not synonymous 
either, as the categories of each are regularly con-
tested. This is certainly not to say that politics and 
religion each do not also concern other matters be-
yond the other, but it is to say that their relationship 
is dynamic and, again, often mutually defining. 
What bringing these two lines of thought to-
gether will mean for political theory and theory of 
religion has yet to be filled out fully and needs more 
complete description in the field, but the ground is 
prepared for this constructive undertaking. This is 
where Tillich’s work offers an interesting study, if 
one that still needs much further development for a 
contemporary theory of religion and political theory.  
While Tillich’s own theonomous ethics repre-
sent another type of attempt to describe the religious 
and secular in a more integrated relationship,6 and 
his method of correlation proposes a particular mu-
tually-questioning between religion and culture,7 it is 
the model that he proposes for religion and culture, 
which is of highest interest to me here as one model 
for theorizing the mutual negotiation of religion and 
politics. On the one hand, it is clear that the scholar 
of religion cannot import the theological dimensions 
of Tillich’s proposal, and Tillich himself helps in 
this regard, through his distinction between religion 
and the churches from his “Spiritual Presence.” 
Nonetheless, on the other hand, the sociological de-
scription of Tillich’s may indeed provide a useful 
model for a contemporary re-description of the rela-
tionship between religion and (previously-presumed 
secular) politics, an essential component of a re-
envisioned intersection between political theory and 
theory of religion. In this regard, Tillich is clear: 
“The churches [religions] are sociological realities, 
showing all the ambiguities of the social self-
creation of life. Therefore, they have continuous en-
counters with other sociological groups [such as 
(secular) politics], acting upon them and receiving 
from them…the influence is mutual.”8 He offers a 
typology wherein the mutual influence is in the form 
of “the way of silent interpenetration” and “the way 
of critical judgment.”9 The first concerns the con-
stant “mutual exchange” between religion and soci-
ety and the second the mutual criticism of each by 
the other—particularly important in liberal democ-
ratic societies, where the boundaries between relig-
ion and the legal-political realm, and the religious 
and the secular, are constantly being negotiated.  
To these two, Tillich adds what he calls “the 
way of political establishment.” Here, Tillich argues 
that religion has political import and that the 
churches are themselves subject to political com-
promise. “They must be ready not only to direct but 
also to be directed,”10 he concludes. I go a step fur-
ther and note that, for a theory of religion and poli-
tics that takes practice seriously (among all the other 
elements it may also include), this compromise is a 
genuine re-defining of the religious and (secular) 
political, not a simple concession, or a “directing” of 
one over the other—indeed, it is one of the cardinal 
mechanisms of identity formation-negotiation.  
Tillich’s caveat to such “compromise” (in his 
words, “identity negotiation,” in mine) is also of im-
port here, as he places a noteworthy limit on this 
“interpenetration” of the religious and the political, 
namely that “the character of the church as expres-
sion of the Spiritual Community must remain mani-
fest.”11 The scholar of religion, however, cannot en-
dorse the claim of “the Spiritual Community” in the 
fullest Tillichian meaning, and indeed this is another 
important area where Tillich and I part ways. In one 
sense, this, of course, is a theological difference—
Tillich’s caveat is given in the context of his Sys-
tematic Theology, while I want to think through a 
theory of religion and politics for use in theory of 
religion and political theory. In another sense, how-
ever, it is one place where Tillich’s theology suc-
cumbs to the temptation (some might say theological 
necessity) of holding onto some essential element(s), 
something too problematic to insist on for a descrip-
tive theory of religion, and especially for a family 
resemblance theorist such as myself. Nonetheless, 
this difference does have a significant analogy in 
theorizing religion and secular politics, namely, that 
every political and religious individual or commu-
nity may have elements that are to them non-
negotiable. However, resisting any temptation to-
ward “essence,” these non-negotiable elements may 
not be the same for all individuals or communities, 
and must be discerned in history as the lines are 
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variously drawn. In Tillich’s case, it is the persis-
tence of “the Spiritual Community”—for others, it 
may (and does of course) differ, and this can cer-
tainly have serious political (and wider social) con-
sequences, as when the remaining non-negotiable/ 
essentialized feature is the use of violence, circumci-
sion of minors, honor killings, and so on. These can 
become the moments when religion may revolt or 
withdraw from the social contract and/or when the 
political arena will attempt to exclude or dominate 
the religious.  
Where this does not happen, and when the relig-
ious and the political are mutually defining, Tillich 
has laid some initial, though not unproblematic, 
groundwork for the scholar of religion. His work 
may serve as one useful conversation partner for the 
broader and necessary task of re-describing the rela-
tionship between religion and secular politics—and 
the intersection of theory of religion and political 
theory—as going beyond reading either realm as sui 
generis, but instead as frequently circumscribed by 
their ample mutually defining negotiations. 
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Teaching Two Classics in 
Religion/Theology and Culture 
 
David Nikkel 
 
 I regularly teach undergraduates about two of 
Paul Tillich’s most accessible works: The Courage 
to Be and Theology of Culture. The former serves as 
one of three primary source texts in the course, 
“Modern Religious Thought,” while the latter is one 
of two assigned books for “Religion, Art, and Cul-
ture,” this latter course a creation of mine. 
 We do close reading of Courage for a four-week 
period near the beginning of the semester. I provide 
the students with a printout of 73 numbered ques-
tions (most of which have multiple sub-questions), 
generally with relevant page numbers of Courage 
included, to guide their reading and provide ques-
tions for class discussion. I also furnish students 
with a one-page overview of the book, which out-
lines the meaning of “ontological” and the main 
points of each of the six chapters, along with a few 
appropriate graphics. While the University of North 
Carolina—Pembroke is not particularly selective, 
students generally succeed in understanding Tillich’s 
meaning. Enrollees are majors, minors, and other 
upper-level students. 
 Besides offering students significant insights of 
Tillich in theology, philosophy, and cultural analy-
sis, Courage serves the purposes of tracing the line-
age of modern Western religious thought, as stu-
dents can place Tillich in the trajectory of Liberal 
Protestantism and German Romantic Idealism, 
which then are challenged by Neo-Orthodoxy 
(though, of course, in the case of Tillich, not over-
thrown by it!). One aspect of Tillich’s theology that 
rejects the dominant Neo-Orthodox approach in fa-
vor of the Liberal/Idealistic model is the immediate 
connection human beings have with the divine. 
Harkening back to Schleiermacher’s feeling of abso-
lute dependence, in the context of Courage to Be, 
this a priori awareness of the divine and its power of 
being is what enables the person who has lost all 
particular bearers of meaning to summon the cour-
age to forge on. Grasping the significance of this 
rendering of the mystical a priori enables students to 
grapple with Courage’s “God above God”—but 
more on that shortly. Other crucial points of theo-
logical cultural analysis include: (1) Tillich’s three 
types of threats to being from nonbeing—fate with 
its ultimate threat of death, guilt with condemnation, 
and meaninglessness with emptiness—and the re-
spective periods of Western history where each 
threat dominates; (2) the various movements that 
exemplify the courage “to be as a part” of a group 
versus the courage to be as an individual—”to be as 
oneself.” Regarding the three types of threats, stu-
dents discuss how the threats manifest themselves 
personally, insofar as they are aware and comfort-
able doing so, as well as in terms of contemporary 
culture. 
 Tillich’s Courage additionally presents similari-
ties and differences in relation to the next primary 
text, one by the principal expositor of process theol-
ogy, Charles Hartshorne. Interestingly, process the-
ology, like Tillich’s, posits a direct connection with 
the divine, not surprising given the liberal British 
idealistic background for Alfred North Whitehead’s 
work. For process thought, though, our connection 
with the divine comes with concrete content via the 
creature’s prehension of God’s initial aim, or pre-
ferred option, for each unit’s occasion of experience. 
On the other hand, this initial aim is not available for 
our conscious articulation.  
 Tillich’s God above God offers rich resources to 
students for considering divine transcendence and 
immanence—and their interrelationship. Related to 
that pair are Courage’s two poles for the human re-
lationship with God: (1) the personal, the “person-
to-person” or “divine-human encounter,” and (2) the 
“transpersonal” or “mystical” side. Tillich grants a 
clear priority to the second. The first can only be 
affirmed symbolically. If taken literally as in “theo-
logical theism,” “it tries to establish a doctrine of 
God which transforms the person-to-person encoun-
ter into a doctrine about two persons who may or 
may not meet but who have a reality independent of 
each other” (184). Furthermore, the God of this doc-
trine becomes a God of “absolute knowledge and 
control,” which constitutes “the deepest root of the 
Existentialist despair and the widespread anxiety of 
meaninglessness in our period” (185). With respect 
to the second pole, the divine “is nearer to the I than 
the I is to itself.” The transpersonal “God above the 
God of theism unites and transcends the courage to 
be as a part and the courage to be as oneself” (187). 
Tillich continues with a clearly panentheistic state-
ment: “The acceptance of the God above the God of 
theism makes us a part of that which is not also a 
part but is the ground of the whole” (187). Moreo-
ver, this participation does not result in our submer-
gence “in the life of a limited group,” for “[i]f the 
self participates in the power of being-itself it re-
ceives itself back” (188).  
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While students realize that the God above God 
involves a radical immanence, at the same time a 
radical transcendence comes forth. In transcending 
all formulations of the divine, the God above God 
emphasizes that God is not reducible to anything in 
the created world—or any interpolations from any-
thing in the created world. This is especially relevant 
to Courage when all particular formulations of 
meaning become subject to doubt leading to despair. 
Faith in the God above God—”absolute faith”—has 
no “special content” (182; emphasis Tillich’s). Yet 
absolute faith “says Yes to being without seeing 
anything concrete which could conquer” nonbeing 
(189). While process theology’s version of panen-
theism maintains that God is not reducible to the 
world, it does not draw divine transcendence as radi-
cally as the God above God. For process, whatever 
meaning and value God derives comes from God’s 
consequent nature taking in the world’s actualiza-
tions. Not being identified with any particular crea-
tions of the world, including human culture, the God 
above God sets the conditions for and includes all 
worldly creativity. As Tillich puts it given the con-
text of doubt and despair, “the God above the God of 
theism is not the devaluation of the meanings which 
doubt has thrown into the abyss of meaninglessness; 
he is their potential restitution” (186), as the power 
that enables and takes in all the meanings we create. 
By contrast, process philosophy and theology does 
not identify God as the empowering “ground of the 
whole” (for possibility, creativity itself, and finite 
unit occasions of experience have some ultimate on-
tological independence from the divine ground).  
 Theology of Culture supplies the theoretical 
foundation for Religion, Art, and Culture. Students 
receive questions for discussion for the weekly as-
signed readings, with just one question or cluster of 
questions per week. Given that most students take 
this course as a General Education course (and now 
also as a Writing-Enriched course), lecture on each 
covered chapter, including dialectical and other 
graphics, and discussion prove necessary for the 
class to comprehend Tillich’s purposes. In terms of 
concrete cultural analysis, the course focuses on 
films with explicit or implicit religious significance 
(the relevant textbook: Miles’ Seeing and Believing) 
and on important works in the history of Western 
visual art. The class also listens to music related to 
particular artistic periods during gathering time. It is 
interesting to note, as I do for the class, that though 
Tillich frequently analyzed visual art in his theology 
of culture, he did not do the same for the type of art 
that he most indulged in personally as he came home 
from work each day, namely, classical music.  
 From the beginning of the semester, students 
consider Tillich’s claim that all cultural and artistic 
creations manifest an ultimate concern. Many stu-
dents do suspect that some art is merely concerned 
with preliminary matters, whether utilitarian and/or 
aesthetic, as I myself do. But whether or not they 
judge that claim to be too far-reaching, they do reso-
nate with Tillich’s assumption that art and artistic 
movements express the values of a cultural era, as 
we analyze the meanings of the various paintings 
and films. Generally, one chapter of Theology of 
Culture is assigned each week (though the long 
Chapter VII on Existentialism is divided into three 
parts). Additionally, the following chapters are espe-
cially important for the purposes of this course: 
Chapter II: “The Two Types of Philosophy of Relig-
ion,” which builds on Chapter I in giving students’ 
the sense of the immanence of the divine depth di-
mension in all cultural and artistic life for Tillich; 
Chapter IV for formulating Tillich’s classic expres-
sion of the relationship between religion and culture; 
and Chapter VI specifically on visual artistic styles. 
 The fourth chapter introduces students to Til-
lich’s famous couplet: “Religion as ultimate concern 
is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and cul-
ture is the totality of forms in which the basic con-
cern of religion expresses itself.” Or in abbreviated 
fashion: “religion is the substance of culture, culture 
is the form of religion” (42). As just suggested, this 
nicely builds on the first two chapters. In Chapter I, 
Tillich insists that religion cannot be reduced to any 
one cultural function—be it moral, mythological, 
aesthetic, or emotive, that religion does not consti-
tute one cultural form among others, but rather 
serves as the depth dimension within all the others. 
In making this argument, God’s ontological status 
parallels that of religion: God is not a being among 
others, even the highest being, which would wrongly 
separate God from everything else and thus deny 
divine immanence. For Tillich, the divine depth di-
mension can only work, or at least can only work in 
full measure, when we posit that all human beings 
have a direct connection to it, to the immanent di-
vine; religion must involve both human creativity 
and divine power. In Chapter II, Tillich diagnoses 
where Western philosophy and theology took a fate-
ful and drastic wrong turn: in the 13th century of the 
High Middle Ages, when the so-called Augustinian 
ontological approach—where our being has an im-
mediate connection of identity with being-itself—
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became superseded by the Thomistic so-called cos-
mological approach, where our connection to God is 
only an inference of reason. 
 Concerning the famous couplet, students receive 
the final exam, consisting of one broad yet I think 
well-defined question early in the semester: React to 
(explain, analyze, critique/evaluate, and apply) Til-
lich’s claim: “Religion is the substance of culture; 
culture is the form of religion.” Make reference to 
(1) Tillich’s Theology of Culture, (2) films studied in 
the course, (3) art and architecture. Be sure to distin-
guish between explicit religion and supposedly more 
subtle, even secular, cultural expressions with relig-
ious implications or dimensions.  
 Chapter VI represents one of many lectures or 
articles where Tillich categorizes artistic styles. In 
this piece, entitled “Protestantism and Artistic 
Style,” which also appears in the Dillenbergers’ ed-
ited Tillich On Art and Architecture, he specifies 
four artistic styles while bouncing off of Dilthey’s 
philosophical styles: idealistic, realistic, subjective, 
and objective. Elsewhere I have maintained that, 
despite the manifest variety in Tillichian organiza-
tional schemes for artistic styles, the various permu-
tations reduce to three primary styles, namely, ideal-
ism, naturalism, and expressionism. As we analyze 
the manifold stylistic periods in the history of West-
ern art, we keep returning to these three primary 
styles, looking for how the artists idealize or roman-
ticize their subject matter, depict objects in a natural 
or realistic way, or “bend” the normal appearances 
of the subject matter in a way that expresses some-
thing beyond or below the surface. Tillich in a num-
ber of his pieces on artistic styles divides expres-
sionism in the broad sense into a negative and a 
positive mode. This distinction also becomes rele-
vant to the class as we view the examples of visual 
art through the centuries. The artwork is projected 
on screens, with most of the examples coming from 
ArtStor, an electronic database to which our library 
subscribes. Period styles covered include early 
Christian Roman, Byzantine, Romanesque, Gothic, 
early and later Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, 
Classical, Baroque, Rococo, Realist, Romantic, Im-
pressionist, Post-Impressionist, Expressionist, Surre-
alist, Abstractionism, Abstract Expressionism, and 
Pop-art. Relative to Chapter VI, the objective style 
more or less corresponds to a naturalistic style, while 
the subjective corresponds to a positive expression-
ism and the realistic to a negative expressionism. 
 To give a sample of the kind of analysis of art 
that occurs in the class, I will refer to two oil paint-
ings by Cezanne: Montagne Sainte-Victoire from the 
Bibemus Quarry (1897, 64.8 x 81.3 cm, Baltimore 
Museum of Art) and The (Great) Bathers (1894-
1905, 127.2 x 196.1 cm, National Gallery, Great 
Britain). Tillich lionized Cezanne, once penning that 
“an apple of Cezanne has more presence of ultimate 
reality than a picture of Jesus by Hofmann” (On Art 
and Architecture: 144). We note with Tillich a “get-
ting back to basics,” as Cezanne draws (upon) ele-
mental forms, with space being created through ba-
sic shapes, a few basic colors, and simple directional 
lines. One might see a measure of a naturalistic style 
in this, as well as in the choice of subject matter—
nature. Yet, a Romantic expressionism dominates in 
various ways. Nature is the object of Romantic fas-
cination; in this regard, the Romantic primitivism of 
The Bathers stands out. Cezanne’s color palette is 
expressive, with a few bright, dark, and/or deep col-
ors. Finally, the indistinctness of Cezanne’s render-
ings constitutes an expressionism that departs from 
defined “objective” reality. Drawing upon an insight 
of my mentor in Religion and Culture, William Po-
teat, students come to see an important implication 
of Cezanne’s fuzziness: deeply rooted and grounded 
through our embodiment in the world, it is our hu-
man eyes, body, and interactions that bring reality 
into focus. We partially create our world, even as we 
partially create when we interact with the beauty of 
Cezanne’s creations.  
 A nice parallel becomes manifest between Til-
lich’s evaluation of art (and culture more widely) 
and Miles’s evaluation of film: even as explicitly 
religious art may not be very successful in express-
ing the divine depth dimension, while secular art 
may profoundly express that dimension; so explic-
itly religious films may fail in conveying religious 
values in an effective, compelling manner, while 
non-religious films might succeed in conveying the 
deepest values of a culture in a powerful way (what-
ever one makes on Tillich’s claim that all cultural 
creations express some ultimate concern).  
 
Anyone who has presented a pa-
per at the 2012 NAPTS or AAR 
Group Meetings in Chicago and 
has not sent a copy to the editor, 
please do so as soon as possible: 
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Tillichian Pedagogy and New  
Learning Situation: Informative 
Learning, Participative Learning, 
and Self-Determination 
 
Jari Ristiniemi 
 
n pedagogy and in didactics we find three main 
questions: What is the subject or content of teach-
ing and learning? How is it to be mediated in the 
pedagogical situation? Why is the teaching done in 
the given way or, rather, what are the goals of teach-
ing and learning? What, how, and why make up the 
key questions of learning and education. In the 
Scandinavian context, the emphasis has moved from 
pedagogy to didactics: religious education is didac-
tics of religion. Didactics is the design of the learn-
ing situation, including classroom design, ethical 
dimensions, curriculum, and the objectives of the 
course: didactics, in the American context, is cur-
riculum studies. Recent pedagogy studies emotions 
in the classroom, the impact of cultural patterns in 
the learning situation, and the life-politics of peda-
gogy.1 Usually the relationship between the two is 
interpreted in the sense that didactics is subordinated 
to pedagogy: pedagogical philosophy contains a di-
dactic dimension. To describe Tillichian pedagogy I 
use in the widest sense of the word, which includes 
philosophical, political, pedagogical, and didactic 
aspects. With Tillichian pedagogy, I refer to Til-
lich’s philosophy of education. It is said that Tillich 
did not have a philosophy of education and peda-
gogical issues were explicit during the German pe-
riod only.2 This is true; he did not have an explicit 
philosophy of education, but his interest in pedagogy 
is integrated with his thought in profound way. 
Questions how to teach and how learning takes place 
were a part of Tillich’s thinking both during the 
German period and during his time in the United 
States. I think that there is a latent philosophy of 
education in Tillich; the leading motifs of that philo-
sophy are discernible already during the 1920s. If it 
is so that pedagogy is integrated with various aspects 
of Tillich’s thought, an approach that emphasizes 
wholeness is needed in order to catch sight of it. Re-
cent critical education asks for “a holistic engage-
ment with the world that is existentially challenging 
in cognitive, affective and practical terms.”3 Such an 
engagement is to be found in Tillich.   
 Today’s learning situation is different from the 
learning situation just few years back in time. Tech- 
 
nical tools of communication from learning plat-
forms to twitter have pervaded the learning situation. 
Students are not met in real time, but they are spread 
all over the world and the communication is through 
email and learning platforms. Internationally, there 
is an outspoken concurrence between private and 
public universities considering the financial re-
sources, that is, the students. Multinational corpora-
tions have their own universities, educating their 
own highly skilled staff and fostering international 
elite, which has the whole globe as its working-
place.4 Society, locally and globally, is split in two: 
one the one hand, the educated privileged class and 
on the other hand, those who are outside the educa-
tional system, due to their lack of a relevant educa-
tion. Even as the divide is getting wider and wider 
between the two classes, and will probably continue 
to do so in the near future, sustainable strategies in 
education are seen as a way of reducing the cleft.5 
Tillich fought the divisive tendencies during the 
1920s; the cultural trends are backed up by thou-
sands of years of mental history. Education is an 
active force in the society, “conditioning” the society 
and its future in one-way or another; education is, 
and always has been, future-oriented.6 Today it is 
necessary to think through the role of education lo-
cally, globally, culturally, and religiously. It is nec-
essary to discuss the educational tradition and what 
education does to us and for us individually, so-
cially, and globally, and last but not least, it is neces-
sary to discuss the constructive potentials of educa-
tion. I will discuss Tillich’s philosophy of education 
in relation to the recent learning situation; I will try 
to lift up his constructive educational alternatives. 
Traditional teaching, if we are to talk in those terms, 
has emphasized the “what” side of pedagogy: teach-
ing is to communicate formulated knowledge or in-
formation; education is informative learning. The 
“how” side—how we relate to knowledge, how we 
construe knowledge, how we are in relation to each 
other, how we orient ourselves in the light of mean-
ing—has been the “hidden” side of education. In 
Tillich’s thought, and in his pedagogy, the last-
mentioned questions have a central place. To tackle 
the recent political, economical, and cul-
tural/educational situation it is necessary to integrate 
the “what” side with the “how” side! The “how” side 
emphasizes connectedness, identity, meaning, and 
ethical/political issues; the “how” is essential to par-
ticipative learning.  
I 
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Religion is the subject matter in religious educa-
tion, in scientific studies of religion and in theology, 
but do we learn about religion or from religion? This 
last question is widely discussed in the Anglo-Saxon 
religious education, influencing the Scandinavian 
context.7 The scientific study of religion since 
Schleiermacher has examined the outer, historical 
forms and functions of religion. It studies those 
forms of expression to which an objective attitude is 
appropriate: we learn about religion, what it is and 
how it functions. In confessional schools we learn 
from religion, and the only way to understand relig-
ion, it is said, is through participation in a particular 
religion. In non-confessional schools, in the state-
funded schools, the emphasis is on learning about 
religion. The secular state gives room for both ways, 
as it admits the right to religion; it admits the con-
fessional schools. Today it is asked if the “old” ideal 
of scientific study of religion—religion as the object 
of scientific studies—is possible at all.8 Post-
modernity is adhering to relativism in epistemology, 
morality, and religion, and in the study of religion. 
Essentialism is denied and with it both the essential 
human nature and the essential, substantial definition 
of religion. Is all, then, relative? On the other hand, 
we have fundamentalists in Judaism, Islam, Hindu-
ism, and Christianity who claim that the only way to 
understand religion is to study and to live from relig-
ion. There is a considerable pressure coming both 
from relativists and from fundamentalists against the 
scientific study of religion. The questions consider-
ing the possibility of religious studies and of study-
ing theology in schools and universities are impor-
tant questions, touching the very foundations of the 
modern state and the way democratic institutions are 
construed in democratic states. If we cannot study 
religion with scientific means, why should it be a 
subject in schools and universities at all? If the sci-
entific study of religion is not possible, why should 
we then study theology, as theology is a superstruc-
ture to religion? Many things are wrong in this logic 
of exclusion, but the argumentation catches a trend 
in the recent debate. How would Tillich have tackled 
these issues? His is not an extremist position: he 
gives room for the autonomous culture (it is possible 
to study religion with scientific means) and he gives 
room for religion in its various, non-extremist forms. 
Tillich had an integrated view of the relationship 
between the modern autonomous culture and relig-
ion.  
I make a distinction between two levels of learn-
ing: the informative level and the level of participa-
tive learning. The two build up an integral or inte-
grative model; both kinds of learning are needed, if 
we want to have a holistic view on education and 
learning. We are able to highlight Tillich’s philoso-
phy of education with this model. The model helps 
us to discuss Tillich’s pedagogical views, deeply 
embedded in his philosophy and in his cultural the-
ology, helping us to discuss these in relation to re-
cent discussions in pedagogy, didactics, and phi-
losophy. Further, the model proposes a view on re-
ligion and theology, which builds on integration be-
tween religion as a lived reality, religion as a studied 
object, and theology as a faith-perspective in life. 
Life, thinking, and faith are integrated with each 
other in the learning situation. In an integrative 
model, it is possible to point out the different levels 
or dimensions as such, at the same time as a certain 
wholeness is presupposed. We do not only orientate 
ourselves through bits, fragments, and atomistic 
claims (clear statements), but we orient in terms of 
constellations, patterns, “wholes” including values, 
which are mostly rooted in the unconscious. There 
are conscious and non-conscious learning-processes, 
as Damasio puts it: the conscious mind gives only a 
window-view to things and much of learning hap-
pens outside that window-view.9 The interesting 
question of how to educate the unconscious comes 
in view.10 Perhaps learning is about value-
differentiation at the meta-narrative level: that we 
learn about that what is truly important and valuable 
in life, despite the dominating evaluations of our 
commercialized times? When it comes to religion, 
we might make a distinction between what is truly 
valuable and what is only an expression of the “ul-
timate value.” It seems to be the case that both rela-
tivists and fundamentalists place an absolute value-
judgment on that what is not valuable as such, but 
only a representation of the absolute. Derek R. Nel-
son has observed, while using Dynamics of Faith in 
education, that the book “functions primarily as a 
relativizing antidote to absolutizing tendencies.”11 I 
would like to add that Tillich’s philosophical theol-
ogy and its pedagogical application functions as a 
relativizing antidote to absolutizing tendencies in 
understanding culture, politics, morality, and sci-
ence, not only in understanding religion. It relativ-
izes things on the informative level, but it also points 
to something absolute on the relational level. In Til-
lich’s view, the different levels of reality “demand 
different approaches and different languages”.12  
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Informative learning  
 
 When Tillich came to the United States he saw 
that students knew historical facts but he could di-
scern no no emotional, identity-bearing connection 
with the past was discernible. Considering his first 
meetings with American students, Tillich wrote:  
I found that an immediate emotional identifica-
tion with the reality of the past was lacking. 
Many of the students here had an excellent 
knowledge of historical facts, but these facts did 
not seem to concern them profoundly. They re-
mained objects of their intellect and almost 
never became elements of their existence.13  
Perhaps the schools had emphasized the informative 
learning rather than the personal dimension of iden-
tity and orientation in history and in one’s contextual 
space. If so, the teaching was more or less deter-
mined by the objectifying approach: the fact—or 
what-orientation, and not with the how and why ori-
entation. The objectifying approach was that which 
had laid the groundwork for teaching and learning in 
Scandinavia, and perhaps the same could be said for 
teaching and learning in the the United States.  Her-
bert M. Kliebard points to “the yoke of college 
domination” burdening the high school preparatory 
courses for college studies.14 The yoke is still there 
because of the one-sided emphases of traditional 
school subjects. If this is true, universities and 
schools are still in the hands of the informative 
learning, even though there are significant changes 
happening in recent years, according to Kliebard. 
We might say that the informative learning has been 
a dominant trend during the 20th century in Scandi-
navia and perhaps in the United States as well.  
One of the strongest arguments against the he-
gemony of informative learning comes from neu-
rophysiologists in their emphasis on the higher cog-
nitive capacities at the cost of other mind-
capacities.15 If the emphasis is solely on cogni-
tive/informative learning, the emotional capacities 
become impoverished: the capacity for empathetic 
identification with others is lessened, because of the 
one-sided emphasis of the cognitive rationality. In 
1920s, Tillich pointed to a trend in modern educa-
tion, leading to an unbalanced development of per-
sonality. He talked about “the one-sided intellectual 
emphasis in modern education.”16 Education was 
linked with the knowledge-needs of the capitalistic 
industrial society and not with the development of 
the whole personality. The purpose of education was 
to supply the labor-market of the industrial society 
with qualified workers; education gave the means to 
manage the system. Education marked class and the 
intellectual/economic needs of the privileged groups: 
“cultural education becomes the hall mark of a class 
and an instrument of economic power.” 17 In the pre-
vailing education:  
Nature and tradition were regarded not from the 
point of view of their meaning, as referring to the 
eternal, but from the point of view of their finite, 
phenomenal form. Consequently the materials of 
education were to be received intellectually, 
through knowledge of the finite and phenomenal 
form.18  
In Tillich’s view, education had become a part of the 
process of dehumanization and depersonalization:  
The loss of personality is interdependent with 
the loss of community. Only personalities can 
have community. Depersonalized beings have 
social interrelations.… The monopolistic direc-
tion of public communication, of leisure, pleas-
ure, learning, sex relations, sport, etc., does not 
provide a basis for a real community.19   
The informative learning seems to have dominated 
the educational system of the capitalist industrial 
society in the 19th and the 20th century. Since Freire, 
the informative learning is called “banking-
education”: the purpose of teaching is to deliver 
well-formulated facts; students collect the facts and 
store them; the capability to store facts is checked by 
tests.20 In banking-education, it is the teacher, as the 
authoritative representative of the educational sys-
tem, who has the right knowledge and s/he trans-
ports it to pupils and students. The informative 
learning is teacher-centered learning. The informa-
tive learning emphasis is still with us, but now in a 
more sophisticated form. Today we witness “a grad-
ual yet relentless replacement of the orthodox 
teacher-student relationship with the supplier-client, 
or shopping mall-shopper pattern.”21 In the supplier-
client model, it is supposed that learning is a matter 
of buying and selling, and information that which is 
being sold. One part of learning is informative learn-
ing, but learning should not be reduced to transport-
ing information. Informative learning is partial: it 
does not touch the whole human person; the uncon-
scious, symbol-creating dimension of personality, as 
well as any information provided by the senses, is 
excluded in the informative learning. “All move-
ments against the spirit of capitalist society in educa-
tion are united in their opposition to the intellectual-
ism of purely formal training,” Tillich wrote while 
still in Germany.22  
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In America, after 1933, Tillich continues to ar-
ticulate the alternative to the informative learning: it 
is symbols that give the sense of identity and mean-
ing; a depersonalized individual is to restore her or 
his core or centre of personality in interaction with 
other people; both personality and community are to 
be restored; that which happens in one individual, 
affects all others. What is demanded is “a convinc-
ing restatement of the meaning of life…the discov-
ery of symbols expressing it, and…the re-
establishment of personality and community. But 
such a demand includes the demand for an equally 
radical and inseparable social and political construc-
tion.”23 Given the relation of interdependence, which 
in Tillich’s view “links” all dimensions and realms 
of life with each other, there is no restoration of hu-
manity without the corresponding restoration of so-
ciety and community and vice versa. The alternative 
should “include the principle of humanist education, 
…the opening up of human possibilities and the 
providing of opportunities where the pupil may de-
velop in freedom.”24 The alternative includes self-
determination. 
 Informative learning is supposed to build on ab-
stract universalism. It makes use of the universals of 
language and of representation (words, images, and 
signs); universals or common concepts being the 
results of the process of abstraction. It is presup-
posed that words stand for that what they say, that 
there is a one-to-one fit between the representation 
and the represented, the map and the terrain. It is 
supposed that words do nothing more but inform 
about the states of affairs in humans, nature, and so-
ciety. Words, in informative learning, are not sup-
posed to have constructive capacities; rather, they 
tell about the world as it is in itself. Realism and in-
formative learning are supposed to be congruent 
with each other. The one-to-one fit between the rep-
resentation and the represented is questioned today.25 
If there is no one-to-one fit between the representa-
tion and the represented, the word and the object, if 
all things are internal to representation, then relativ-
ism is the inevitable outcome. Relativism, as a phi-
losophical position, is self-contradictory. The claim 
that all stories and all truth-claims are equally true, 
as a relativist claims, is not a relativistic claim: it 
aims to say something true about the stories and 
about the relation of the stories to each other. Tillich 
does not accept the relativist position, but he claims 
that there is relativity at the informative level. In 
Tillich’s view, all representations, as propositions, 
statements, and assertions are relative. Tillich 
thought that the cognitive relation between the rep-
resentation and the represented, the I-It relation, 
gives some knowledge of things and of the universe 
under certain conditions. The condition-dependence 
gives the relativity of representation. It is this de-
pendency on the conditions under which the repre-
sentation takes place that constitutes its relative na-
ture. Empirical truths, for instance, are congruent in 
Tillich’s view with “controlling knowledge” or con-
trolled knowledge. This knowledge “is verified by 
the success of controlling actions. The technical use 
of scientific knowledge is its greatest and most im-
pressive verification.”26 Still, empirical truth-claims, 
built on the controlling knowledge, are relative. The 
controlling knowledge is there under certain condi-
tions: the subject/object structure between the indi-
vidual and the world has come to pass; the thing-
universe is construed; the object of knowledge is 
targeted; the experimenting, and controlling proce-
dures are used in testing the hypotheses. If these 
conditions are fulfilled, the knowledge is there. The 
informative truth-claims, as we find them in science, 
in ethics, and in religion are, in Tillich’s view, prob-
abilities, in this sense they are relative. “Every par-
ticular assertion is preliminary,” he wrote.27 Given 
the above, absolute literal faith in science, that only 
scientific truth-claims are true or that only science 
gives us truth is impossible. In religion, and in relig-
ious education, the relativity of assertions leads to 
the breakdown of logo-centrism: “Verbum is more 
than oratio. Protestantism has forgotten that to a 
great degree. Verbum, word of revelation can be in 
everything in which the spirit expresses itself, even 
in the silent symbols of art.”28 Religious education, 
then, might use all the means through which the 
spirit is able to express itself: rites, rituals, images, 
natural things, art, architecture etc, and not only 
words. Rites and symbols affect the unconscious of 
children (and adults), Tillich wrote, and educators 
should be aware of their affects. “The conquest of 
literalism without the loss of the symbols is the great 
task for religious education,” he wrote.29  
The relativity of assertions is not the last word of 
truth-claims. All truth-claims must meet the abso-
lutes of knowledge: those absolute cognitive condi-
tions that make the truth-claims possible, like the 
categories of mind as formal structures of the mind 
and being, as we presuppose that natural things, even 
as objects of science, have being. The absolutes are 
there, but we cannot say what they are; they cannot 
become objects of knowledge, as knowledge itself 
presupposes them. Given the underlying absolutes of 
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the cognitive relation, Tillich’s position is not the 
relativist philosophical position. Tillich formulated 
this in the following way: “Each of our statements 
about the absolutes in knowledge is relative…But 
the absolutes themselves are not relative.”30 In sense 
impressions, there is something prevailing and abso-
lute, even if we cannot formulate it in clear and defi-
nite terms, something that “stands there” despite the 
changing flux of perception. In human encounters, 
there is something absolute: the demand to admit the 
Other as a person on her/his own right, despite the 
relativity of moral prescriptions and laws.31 There is, 
further, “the logical and semantic structure of the 
mind,” which is absolute and which must be presup-
posed in all truth-claims. There is the fundamental 
and “the basic absolute”: being, as we presuppose 
that all things have being.32 None of the absolutes is 
an object, but all empirical and controlling knowl-
edge needs objects. There is no possibility to say 
what these absolutes are: they must be presupposed 
as belonging to the mind/world encounter. We 
should have an open and critical mind while making 
use of informative learning. Experimental verifica-
tion must be combined with “experiential verifica-
tion,” Tillich wrote.33  
Humans and higher animals are products of evo-
lution; evolution is there as part of the life-process, 
when we start to claim that humans and animals are 
nothing but material products of evolution, we make 
a metaphysical claim. Given the scientific perspec-
tive, it is highly probable that humans are products 
of evolution and that we have a this-worldly life-
history, but to claim that we are nothing but products 
of evolution shuts out the other possibilities and 
other interpretations.  Science gives us a means of 
understanding nature and of natural processes in 
terms of cause and effect, but it is not only science 
that gives us knowledge, and science gives us only 
one kind of knowledge. When we start to claim that 
through scientific understanding of nature we control 
nature and the future direction of life-process, we 
make a metaphysical claim and place ourselves 
above life. We become victims of a modern myth: 
that only the scientific perspective with its control-
ling knowledge gives true knowledge of the universe 
and of its future direction. “The world as a universal 
machine is the myth of the modern man, and his 
ethos is the elevation of the personality to the mas-
tery of this machine,” Tillich wrote.34 The elevated 
personality is still a depersonalized individual, if the 
elevation is in the power of the machine only. The 
determination is from the outside.  
The question of self-determination actualizes it-
self. In a depersonalized society, education is not 
able to reach its goal, which is “to give a personal 
center which can radiate into all sectors of contem-
porary life.”35 Still the individual has “the capacity 
of becoming personality…Personality is that being 
which has the power of self-determination, or which 
is free; for to be free means to have power over 
one’s self, not to be bound to one’s given nature.”36 
In a depersonalized situation, the personal center is 
not reached and the power of self-determination is 
broken; the bond to one’s humanity is lost. Tillich 
thought that genuine self-determination is possible 
only in the power of the humanity of humans, that is, 
in relation to the essential human nature: “the deter-
mining subject can determine only in the power of 
what it essentially is. But under the conditions of 
existential estrangement, it is separated from what it 
essentially is.”37 What this means is that the bond to 
common humanity is to be re-established. One goal 
of Tillichian pedagogy is to create space for the res-
toration of the humanity of humans. This does not 
mean that there are not any other forms of self-
determination than the restoring act. 
 
Participative learning and self-determination 
 
In the orthodox teacher-student relationship, it is the 
teacher who stands for knowledge and transports this 
knowledge in a one-way communication to the stu-
dents. Tillich saw the alternative to the informative 
learning in encouraging creativity, participation, and 
originality on the part of students and pupils. In 
1920’s, while referring to the new pedagogy, he 
wrote:  
The authoritative communication of the subject 
matter is opposed; originality and creative activ-
ity on the part of the pupil are encouraged. Vital 
participation of the pupil in perceptual reality is 
to take the place of the intellectual communica-
tion of the rational and abstract forms of things. 
Fellowship between the pupils and between 
them and the teacher is proclaimed as the ideal 
form of the educational relationship. This is all 
of great importance for the religious situation of 
the present and particularly of the future. Love 
of community and love of things are beginning 
to prevail.38 
What this means is that the learning situation is to be 
constructed in such a way that pupils, students, and 
teachers participate in this activity or act in which 
truth, community, meaning, and society are in the 
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making. Recently Victoria Rue has written: “Class-
rooms can be arenas for building communities too. 
When classroom become communities of learning, 
students and teachers are ‘rehearsing’ the society 
they would like to see.”39 This new community-
building, at the same time as the processes of com-
munity-destruction are accelerating locally and 
globally, is one of the possibilities of the new peda-
gogy today. The emphasis is turned from informa-
tive to participative learning.  
In the participative learning situation, pupils, 
students, and teachers share the common relation-
ship in collecting information, in construing/creating 
new knowledge, and in orientating themselves in the 
light of that which is the goal and meaning of life. 
To orient oneself in the light of meaning is not to 
give consent to a represented world or an informed 
world; it is not to move on the informative level 
only, but it is both to ask the question of meaning 
and to act for meaning in the prevailing situation, 
“from below.” To orient in the light of meaning does 
not mean that schools and universities are turned 
into religious congregations, as participative learning 
gives room for autonomy and autonomous culture 
(informative learning). It means that there is room 
for human questioning, a human search for meaning, 
and for human self-determination. “The humanistic 
question is radical; it goes to the roots and does not 
accept anything whatsoever as being beyond ques-
tioning… Christianity includes humanism and the 
radical question of truth which is the first principle 
of humanism.”40 Further, participative or integral 
learning gives room for drama and art, as these are 
bearers of stories, narratives, rites, and symbols. 
Narratives, rites, and symbols give the sense of iden-
tity and meaning, in Tillich’s terminology: they give 
the reunion with the center of personality, creating 
the very core of personality; personality comes into 
being. If there is the loss of identity, meaning, and 
community (depersonalized individuals and deper-
sonalized communities fostering non-personal social 
interrelations), then drama and art, the opening up of 
the symbolic dimension of things, might be a way to 
counteract that loss. The symbolic dimension is not 
only in the individual; it links the individual with 
being. The participative or integral learning makes 
use of art, metaphors, and symbols; it points to and 
participates in the creative dimension of being; it 
deals with ontological issues. Tillich pointed to the 
creativity of being: “Reality itself creates structural 
possibilities within itself. Life, as well as mind, is 
creative.”41 Today, hardly any professional educator 
does not admit the indispensability of art in learning, 
and with it the creative interaction between mind, 
being, and society:  
 “Then we really may believe that mountains are 
living?” asks one of the young girls in The Eth-
ics of the Dust. “Things are not either wholly 
alive, or wholly dead. They are more or less 
alive,” responds Ruskin’s Lecturer, and he has 
the girls—not unlike Millais’s angels fifteen 
years before—walk around and grasp each 
other’s hands, as in a dance, creating “crystals of 
life,” to empirically teach them the configura-
tional nature of things… The Gothic is an archi-
tecture of relationality, of entanglement, an ar-
chitecture that constantly forges new relation-
ships and expresses them in every possible form 
and shape.42   
 
Map-making 
 
Participative learning is structural and relational: 
it studies the human ways of relating and map-
making. In Keri Facer’s view, “building the map is 
the basis for all learning and for the mutual encoun-
ter.”43 Informative learning presupposes the sub-
ject/object relation between the individual and the 
world, that is, it presupposes a certain map. The 
grounding coordinate of that map is the sub-
ject/object relation between the individual and the 
world. The subject/object relation between the self 
and the world is a product of self-determination: the 
position of observer is construed in relation to the 
world out there. The modern autonomous self is 
born in this act of self-determination: the self posits 
itself as an autonomous thinking subject in relation 
to the world. This act grounds the modern autono-
mous culture. Tillich named the self/world structure: 
“the basic ontological structure.”44 The autonomous 
self is individualistic, punctual, and independent.45 In 
Tillich we, however, discover a second phase of 
self-determination in addition to the initial phase of 
self-determination. The coming into being of the 
modern autonomous subjective self is an initial 
phase of self-determination. It is a necessary step, 
laying the ground of the autonomous culture and the 
basic ontological structure of the self/world relation, 
but human beings not only relate objectively with 
the world, they also relate to each other, affect each 
other, and realize themselves in interdependence and 
in interaction with each other. The marks of the sec-
ond phase of self-determination are discernible in 
Tillich. Religion, culture, morality, and education 
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might be understood in the light of the second phase 
of self-determination:  
Western education builds on the humanistic 
ideal: the individual is to develop her/his intellectual, 
emotional, moral, and volitional capacities and po-
tentials. The humanistic educational ideal has its root 
in Renaissance, even if the modern education has 
disregarded the affective levels of interdependence 
and interaction, which were still a part of the Renais-
sance humanism. Education, humanistic education, 
helps us to go from darkness and ignorance to the 
clarity of rational reason. Only the individual with 
reason is free and autonomous. Freedom is the free-
dom of speech, of opinion, of religion; freedom is to 
choose one’s way as a reflecting person. The human-
istic educational ideal builds on strong self-
determination: the individual as such is capable of 
reaching the goal of learning, which is the balanced 
development of personality. According to human-
ism, the individual as such is in touch with the es-
sential human nature and human nature comes to 
expression in the activity of thinking, feeling, and 
willing, in the species activity. The goal is to think 
independently, to differentiate between the self-
feeling and mere reactions, and to act independently 
in the power of the reflecting reason. A humanist 
works for the benefit of others; s/he serves human-
ity; s/he is a uomo universale. In Tillich’s view, the 
opportunity of the development of personality is 
given only to a few privileged individuals; large 
groups of people are left outside of the humanistic 
educational ideal: 
Because of human finitude, no one can fulfill the 
humanist ideal, since decisive human potentiali-
ties will always remain unrealized. But even 
worse, the human condition always excludes 
…the vast majority of human beings from the 
higher grades of cultural form and educational 
depth…Therefore, the question “Educating into 
what?” must be answered in a way which in-
cludes everyone who is a person. But culture 
cannot do that by itself—just because of the am-
biguities of humanism. Only a self-transcending 
humanism can answer the question of the mean-
ing of culture and the aim of education.46  
In Tillich’s view, the humanistic educational ideal is 
correct, but given the conditions of existence, it is 
unattainable in its entirety: an individual is not capa-
ble of realizing the whole human potential. Tilli-
chian pedagogy admits of the humanistic educational 
ideal; the ideal is partly reachable for certain indi-
viduals under certain conditions, but given the fac-
tual conditions of human life this ideal is not reach-
able for all. Because of the factual conditions, the 
goal of educational ideal should be such that it in-
cludes all persons and not only those who have the 
privilege of education. Tillich wrote: “Humanity is 
attained by self-determination and other-
determination in mutual dependence. The individual 
strives for her/his own humanity and tries to help 
others reach humanity, an attempt which expresses 
her/his humanity.”47 Under the condition of exis-
tence the relationship to the human essential nature 
is broken and fragmented; it is ambiguous, and 
“therefore, self-determination into fulfilled humanity 
is impossible; nevertheless, it is necessary.”48 Human 
life, at the stage of autonomous culture, is a mixture 
of existential and essential elements. If humans lived 
in the best of the worlds, the ideal of fulfilled hu-
manity would be reached by all. In real life, this is 
not the case because of the social, economic, and 
political conditions, and not least, because of the 
estrangement cutting through all life and all levels of 
encounter and understanding, leaving large groups 
of people outside the humanistic educational ideal. 
Therefore, the complete self-determination into ful-
filled humanity (the uninhibited species activity) is 
practically impossible. Still humans are to strive for 
development on their own and the humanistic ideal 
should be a part of education; partly it is reachable 
for individuals as individuals.  
Thus far, the autonomous culture and humanistic 
education are such: the informative learning gives 
some knowledge of the world; autonomous cultural 
forms in education, science, and morality are there 
on their own; an individual is a mixture of existential 
and essential elements; the moments of the species 
activity are there, but the species activity is mixed 
with self-seeking and inhibited by estrangement; 
there is the cleft between the individual and the es-
sential human nature. An individual cannot elevate 
her/himself to a constant uninhibited species activ-
ity; it is available only momentarily. The species 
activity is in the individual; at the same time, it is 
above the individual, determining her or him in the 
activity of thinking, feeling, and willing. If the spe-
cies activity is there, the center of personality is re-
stored in relation to the human essential nature. 
False forms of self-elevation and self-sufficiency 
break down as the species activity is for all individu-
als as individuals. The species activity is expressing 
the human nature or the humanity of humans. One 
central goal of Tillichian pedagogy is, then, the res-
toration of the humanity of humans; the question 
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“Education into what?” might be answered in terms 
of the humanity of humans: the society is to be con-
strued in such a way that the humanity of humans is 
reached by all. Education or learning is to create the 
space in which the center of personality is restored. 
 
The Givenness of Being and of Human Nature 
 
In Tillich’s view, education or learning should 
go “deeper into reality” than the humanistic ideal 
seems to allow for. The goal of learning is initiation 
into the basic structures and relations of being, not 
only into those possibilities and potentials that are 
included in human nature in the autonomous culture. 
Being and human nature are congruent with each 
other according to Tillich: both are “givens” and 
they, so to say, “come together.” Tillich links the 
question of the goal of human development with 
being, much in the same way as Heidegger did in his 
Letter on Humanism. In Tillich’s view, the essential 
human nature is congruent with being; the species 
activity and being are congruent with each other. In 
this view, “the idea of humanism is transcended 
without being denied.”49 The idea of humanism is 
that each and every individual as such, through self-
determination, is capable of the uninhibited activity 
of thinking, feeling, and willing; that the essential 
human nature is expressed in and through the indi-
vidual. In Tillich’s view, education is “initiation,” 
pointing “to the terminus ad quem, the “where to.” 
Secular culture has lost an ultimate and commanding 
terminus ad quem, because it has lost an ultimate 
and unconditional concern.”50 In 1946, Tillich 
thought that the content of religious education, the 
where-to, is the sacred void.51 Later he seemed to 
have thought that the seriousness in questioning the 
direction, goal, and meaning of life, disregarding 
culture or particular religion, points to the presence 
of the holy in all life. This gives a non-religious in-
terpretation of religion. The holy or the eternal, or as 
Tillich preferred to call it, the Spiritual Presence, is 
in all life, not only in the religious life. There is the 
spiritual dimension in life itself, the spiritual dimen-
sion comes to expression in religion, in morality, but 
it also comes to expression outside religion. It is at 
this point that map-making becomes crucial as it 
helps us to point out the presence of the holy in the 
human life-encounter. The experience of the holy 
comes from the dimension preceding the sub-
ject/object split. The question of education and ini-
tiation, the question of “where to,” might be an-
swered in terms of the givenness of the preceding 
dimension. Self-determination is in relation to the 
preceding dimension: 
The moral act, the act of personal self-
constitution in the encounter with other persons, 
is based on participation in the transcendent un-
ion. This participation makes the moral act pos-
sible. By its Spiritual impact, the preceding tran-
scendent union creates the actual union of the 
centered person with itself, the encountered 
world, and the ground of self and world.52  
It is not only the development of personality that is 
the goal of education, but also a creative relation-
ship with the creative source of all life prior to the 
subject/object split. In morality and in religion, 
“the preceding absolute” comes to expression. The 
Other, through her/his very existence demands to 
be accepted as a person. In Tillich’s view there is:  
The permanent resistance of every personality 
against any attempt to make it into a thing, to 
appropriate it and deprive it of its self-
determination, is the presupposition for the rise 
of personality as such. Without this resistance of 
the “thou” to the “ego,” without the uncondi-
tional demand embodied in every person to be 
acknowledged as a person in theory and in prac-
tice, no personal life would be possible. A per-
son becomes aware of her/his own character as a 
person only when s/he is confronted by another 
person. Only in the community of the I and the 
thou can personality arise.53  
The unconditional demand is the absolute in the hu-
man-to-human encounter. It is only in relation to the 
Other that we learn about ourselves. In meeting the 
Other we also become aware of that which in that 
very meeting transcends both the self and the Other: 
that we have a common humanity and that we are 
connected with the universe; we partake of some-
thing bigger than our selves. Being and the humanity 
of humans are interconnected. The absolute at the 
relational level is the demand to accept the Other as 
a person on her or his own (the moral act). This ac-
ceptance we cannot do, if we have not felt and expe-
rienced the acceptance on our own part. If the accep-
tance is there, the core of personality is there and the 
Other is allowed to stand her/his own ground and to 
develop in freedom. Our self-determination happens 
only in relation to the Other; self-determination is 
mutual enterprise at the relational level. As we learn 
to see beyond ourselves, we see that the Other comes 
with a world to us, that s/he is a bearer of a world, a 
true mask of God, God in disguise, whatever culture 
or religion s/he represents. S/he is a gift.   
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The relationship to the preceding dimension is in 
all life. Religious education, then, is not to teach a 
religious way of living, but it is to learn both about 
religion and from religion what in religion tran-
scends religion: the infinite is in religion, but it is 
not from religion. The Spiritual Presence or God is 
in the givenness of the encountered life. Religious 
education in ethics is not only to learn about the 
moral prescriptions throughout human history and in 
different cultures, it is also to learn about that which 
in moral life transcends morality: the demand com-
ing from each and every person to be accepted as 
person, whatever culture or whatever nation, what-
ever religion this particular person belongs to. The 
acceptance is there in the power of that what tran-
scends the individual selves and particular cultures. 
The Other is accepted as such: s/he is allowed to 
stand his or her own ground; s/he is allowed to ex-
press her/his meaning and identity through symbols 
suitable for her or him; the species activity is en-
couraged. Learning is about the restoration of the 
humanity of humans.  
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Theology vs. Secular Reason? The 
Dualism of Radical Orthodoxy and 
Promise of Paul Tillich’s  
Correlational Method 
 
Daniel Miller 
 
John Milbank has famously asserted that the 
“pathos of modern theology” has been “its false hu-
mility” (Milbank 2006, 1) with regard to “secular 
reason.” The source of this false humility, present in 
both neo-orthodox and liberal forms, has been mod-
ern theology’s captivity to modern dualisms, evi-
denced by the fact that they allowed for the possibil-
ity of “worldly knowledge” as separable from reve-
lation and therefore valid in its own sphere (Milbank 
et. al., 2). Graham Ward and Milbank find theology 
faced with a stark choice: either theology will again 
become a “meta-discourse,” positioning all other 
discourses, or it will be “positioned by secular rea-
son” and “turn[ed] into the oracular voice of some 
finite idol, such as historical scholarship, humanist 
psychology, or transcendental philosophy” (Milbank 
2006, 1). Theology must frame all other disciplines, 
“otherwise these disciplines will define a zone apart 
from God, grounded literally in nothing” (Milbank 
et. al., 3). It should be clear, given considerations 
such as these, that overcoming dualisms is not a 
concern of secondary importance for “Radical Or-
thodoxy” (hereafter “RO”) (I should note here that in 
this paper I use “Radical Orthodoxy” interchangea-
bly with “Ward” and “Milbank,” whose theological 
agendas I take to be essentially the same). Indeed, 
Milbank affirms James Smith’s sympathetic descrip-
tion of Radical Orthodoxy as embodying a mood of 
“refusal of dualisms” (Milbank 2004, 12).  
Ward and Milbank’s means of insuring that 
there is no such “extra-divine” zone lies in their 
robustly metaphysical, neo-Platonic theological 
schema (which is no doubt already familiar to 
many).  On this model, the created order “is” or has 
being only because it participates in the Being of 
God. Thus, all good things in the world “analogi-
cally concur,” as Milbank puts it (Milbank 2006, 
xvi) with each other insofar as they share in common 
participation in the Good (with a capital “G”), which 
is God. On this schema, there can be no extra-divine 
ontology or realm of being, so that dualism is in 
principle ruled out in advance. What, then, of the 
obvious fact that the entirety of the created order 
seems not to be “good,” but “fallen,” and even ac-
tively resistant to the goodness of God? Ward and 
Milbank do not deny this aspect of created existence, 
but explain it via appeal to an Augustinian notion of 
the privation of being. The fallen world does not 
represent another ontological order opposed to God, 
but a failure to fully participate in God. These as-
pects of the created order therefore “are” not any-
thing, but are in fact a failure to be. Rather than rep-
resenting a realm of being opposed to God, they rep-
resent a lack of being. Within this schema, the 
Church plays a central role (in my view RO is first 
and foremost an ecclesiology). The Church is that 
community that most fully participates in the Being 
of God, proleptically anticipating the full and proper 
participation of the full created order in God. As 
such, Church is tasked with, in Ward’s words, per-
forming the “march of God in the world” (Ward 
2004, 56) and bringing “the world…to an under-
standing of itself” (96), which to say of its true na-
ture as “participated being.” RO’s claim to overcome 
dualism, then, is grounded in the assurance that there 
is no zone of being “apart from God.”  
RO, based in this metaphysical schema, there-
fore stands apart from “modern theology,” which is 
defined by its acceptance that philosophy “has its 
own legitimacy, its own autonomy, apart from faith” 
(Milbank et. al., 21). This capitulation on the part of 
modern theology means that the “knowledge of 
God” can be articulated only “in terms of philoso-
phically derived categories of being and knowing, 
the legitimacy of which liberal theology has for-
feited the right to adjudicate” (Milbank 1999, 21). It 
is at this point that we can introduce Paul Tillich. 
Though he does not always appear by name, Tillich 
is the paradigmatic figure of this capitulation on the 
part of liberal theology. Ward, to give a single ex-
ample, finds in Tillich’s concern for “the ultimate” 
(a phrase Tillich in fact takes measures to avoid [cf. 
Tillich 1951, 12]) an appeal to a supposed universal-
ity exceeding the specifically theological that ulti-
mately leads to the “liquidation of religion” (Ward 
2003, 115, 119). As Smith sums up the RO reading 
of Tillich, “for Tillich, the claims of Christian reve-
lation simply confirm the more universal disclosure 
of our dependence on the ‘ground of being’” (Smith 
36). Tillich’s theology is, for RO, hopelessly mired 
in, and defined by, the structuring dualisms of mod-
ern theology. 
I want to suggest not only that RO’s narrative is 
simplistic as it pertains to Tillich’s thought, but that 
the situation is, in fact, reversed: RO, as formulated 
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by Ward and Milbank, is constitutively dualistic, 
while Tillich’s theology provides more promising 
resources for advancing a non-dualistic theological 
program. This section and the next will consider the 
constitutive duality of RO and the non-dualistic 
promise of Tillich’s thought. In the final section of 
the paper, I will suggest, however, that Tillich’s 
theological model, as it stands, does not fully deliver 
on its promise, and outline the contours of my own 
critical appropriation of Tillich’s thought. 
Concerning the constitutive dualism of RO, I 
begin by endorsing (and expanding) Virginia Bur-
rus’s suggestion that RO represents a striking con-
temporary example of a heresiology. As Burrus 
notes, “orthodoxy enters the stage of history hand in 
hand with heresiology,” the former being impossible 
or unnecessary without the latter (Burrus 36). While 
orthodoxy presents itself as a (re)articulation of 
Christian truth undertaken in response to, and so 
subsequent to, heresiological error, “in practice or-
thodoxy and heresy must always be spoken in the 
same breath, at the same time…there is no ortho-
doxy without heresy…no original without mimicry” 
(37).  My contention is that what holds for ortho-
doxy holds equally well for “Radical Orthodoxy.” 
Despite their insistence on the ultimate ontological 
un-reality of that which opposes God and the Chris-
tian community, Ward and Milbank are ultimately 
able to advance their theological program only in 
opposition to “secular reason” (to use Milbank’s 
phrase again).  Both the “radicality” and the “ortho-
doxy” of their program are dependent on their oppo-
sition to the stark alternatives of nihilism, secular-
ism, violence, and so forth. We have already seen 
this in Milbank’s insistence that either theology will 
position all other discourses or be positioned by 
them (cf. Hyman, 70). While theology’s “other” 
might be unreal in principle, in practice RO does not 
advance a single step without constituting itself on 
the basis of that to which it stands opposed.  Its own 
non-oppositional, positive identity is at least as un-
real as that it attributed to the objects of its critique.  
As a result, Ward and Milbank in fact fail to over-
turn a single one of the fundamental dualisms of 
which they are so critical (cf. Hyman, 70). 
What, then, of Tillich’s theology?  What draws 
me to Tillich’s thought is its promise for articulating 
a more thoroughly non-dualistic theology than that 
advanced by RO. What I specifically have in mind 
are Tillich’s related notions of correlation and relig-
ious symbols. I want to make two points before turn-
ing to a consideration of Tillich. First, it is obviously 
not possible to develop these ideas adequately in the 
brief time available here, so what follows remains 
preliminary and thematic.  Second, my appropriation 
of Tillich is critical and constructive.  While I find 
great promise in some of Tillich’s central insights, I 
think they also stand in need of significant revision 
if they are to fully deliver on that promise.  I will 
outline the points of such a revision in the final sec-
tion of the paper. 
It is a mistake, in my view, to understand Til-
lich’s method of correlation in the dualistic terms we 
have seen RO ascribe to it.  The key to getting at this 
point, for me, lies in Tillich’s insistence on the “mu-
tual interdependence” of “existential questions” and 
“theological answers” that defines the method of 
correlation (Tillich 1951, 60).  There is, then, a mu-
tual interdependence between “God for us” and “we 
for God”—though Tillich does still differentiate the 
self-manifestation of God from “God in his abyssal 
nature,” a distinction I would contest on phenome-
nological grounds (61). Thus, “ultimate concern,” 
the properly theological object is irreducible to “pre-
liminary concern,” but nevertheless is only given 
insofar as preliminary concern becomes the “vehi-
cle” of ultimate concern (13). It is only in and 
through the finite that the infinite becomes real (13). 
Putting the issue in terms that reflect Tillich’s own 
Heideggerian influences, the infinite (ultimate con-
cern) “is” only insofar as it is given through the fi-
nite (preliminary concern). This interdependence 
means that, “the ‘divine-human-encounter’ means 
something real for both sides” (61). 
The mutual interdependence of ultimate and pre-
liminary, finite and infinite, human and divine is the 
point at which Tillich’s correlational method con-
ceptually displaces dualism. Tillich is explicit that 
any aspect of finite reality (i.e., any preliminary con-
cern) has the potential to manifest the infinite (i.e., 
ultimate concern) (cf. Tillich 1951, 13, 118) This 
gives a central role to “culture,” defined by Tillich as 
“the totality of forms in which the basic concern of 
religion [i.e., ultimate concern] expresses itself” 
(Tillich 1964, 42). As he famously states the issue, 
then, “religion is the substance of culture” and “cul-
ture is the form of religion,” this “definitely prevents 
the establishment of a dualism of religion and cul-
ture” (42). The mutual interdependence of finite and 
infinite therefore announces for Tillich “the disap-
pearance of the gap between the sacred and secular 
realm” (41).   
Tillich’s theology, then, conceptually displaces 
dualism (and he addresses other forms of dualism 
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beyond that of sacred and secular, theology and cul-
ture). But so does RO’s Neo-Platonic metaphysical 
schema. Given this point, why do I think that Til-
lich’s theology actually displaces dualism in a way 
that RO’s does not? The answer lies in Tillich’s no-
tion of religious symbols and, more specifically, in 
his conception of the “birth” and “death” of religious 
symbols. Tillich refers to those aspects of finite cul-
ture that becomes the vehicles of ultimate concern as 
“symbols,” which he differentiates from mere 
“signs.”  Like signs, symbols point beyond them-
selves, but in such a way that they participate in the 
reality to which they point (Tillich 1964, 54).  The 
notion of religious symbols is obviously related to 
that of correlation.  When finite, conditioned reali-
ties become vehicles of the unconditioned, their 
mundane reality enters into a “revelatory correla-
tion” (Tillich 1951, 118), thereby opening up the 
“depth dimension” of reality which otherwise re-
mains inaccessible (Tillich 1964, 59). 
To this point, of course, Tillich and RO actually 
sound a quite a bit alike (a point which would be 
worth exploring, given more time). What sets them 
apart is Tillich’s further formulation of religious 
symbols and their “birth” and “death.”  Religious 
symbols are not, for Tillich, arbitrarily created.  On 
the contrary, they either “open up” reality or they do 
not (Tillich 1964, 58).  A religious symbols is there-
fore “true” if it “adequately expresses the correlation 
of some person with final revelation,” if it no longer 
does so it becomes obsolete or “dies” (Tillich 1951, 
240).  Or, on the other hand, a symbol is “born” 
when some aspect of finite reality opens reality up to 
the unconditioned that had previously remained in-
accessible. 
It is with the notion of the birth and death of re-
ligious symbols that Tillich’s thought shows far 
more promise for overcoming dualism than does 
RO, for at least two reasons.  First, I think Tillich’s 
concept of religious symbols harbors an irreducibly 
aleatory dimension of a kind lacking in RO. Tillich 
is explicit that anything can become a religious sym-
bol (cf. Tillich 1951, 118) and that the locus of reve-
lation cannot be foreseen (120), the significance of 
which is heightened by the recognition that a symbol 
can cease to be revelatory. Not only can the locus of 
revelation not be determined in advance, but also it 
is impossible to determine when and if media might 
fail to serve a revelatory function any longer. Ac-
cepting these points, the social simply cannot be de-
terminatively divided into the realms of the relig-
ious/theological, on the one side, and the secu-
lar/cultural, on the other. On the contrary, the rela-
tion between religion/theology and the secu-
lar/cultural becomes undecidable (in specifically 
Derridean terms), calling into question the fixed 
identity of each side of the dualism as such. 
The second reason I find such promise in Til-
lich’s thought lies in the intensification of these im-
plications of his thought when combined with his 
recognition of the mutually interdependent character 
of correlational relations.  If, to repeat, “God for us” 
and “we for God” are both conditioned by the corre-
lational relationship, and if the effectiveness of the 
“vehicle” mediating that relationship (i.e., the sym-
bol) is not itself insured, then neither are “God for 
us” or “we for God” (I am reserving discussion of 
“God in his abyssal nature” for later). Tillich’s the-
ology, on this reading, cannot consistently subsume 
theological reason to secular reason because the very 
identities of the theological and the secular are in 
constant flux. 
Perhaps it will help to illustrate these points, and 
their contrast with the overall thrust of RO, by con-
sidering Tillich’s complex formulations of the rela-
tion of the church to culture (ecclesiology also pro-
vides a fitting illustration in light of RO’s significant 
ecclesiological concerns).  In the third volume of the 
Systematic Theology, Tillich insists that the “Spiri-
tual Community” of “New Being” inaugurated in the 
Christ event cannot simply be equated with the 
Christian churches (cf. Tillich 1963, 152) because 
the latter remain irreducibly caught up in the ambi-
guities of cultural life (cf. 246). As he puts it, the 
churches are “distortions as well as representations 
of the Spiritual Community,” with the result that 
“their relation to culture is itself culture and not the 
answer to the question implied in culture” (246, em-
phasis added).  This point operates in opposition to 
dualism, either in the form of a theocratic subsump-
tion of the secular or a secular subsumption of the 
Christian churches (246). Further, the “freedom of 
the Spirit,” which I take as a reference to the alea-
tory nature of the birth of religious symbols, is such 
that “the secular” is “open to the impact of the Spirit 
without the mediation of a church” (247, emphasis 
added). Thus, Tillich insists that “the Spirit can and 
often has become manifest” in “movements, groups, 
and individuals who are not only on the secular pole 
of the ambiguities of religion but who are openly 
hostile to the churches and beyond this to religion 
itself in all its forms, including Christianity” (247). 
In my terms, the boundaries between church and 
non-church become ultimately undecidable. 
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This stands in marked contrast to the dominant 
ecclesiological themes in Ward and Milbank. Now, 
it is true that Ward at times sounds positively Tilli-
chian, writing that all human lived experience is ir-
reducibly hermeneutical (cf. Ward 2004, 114) and 
that “‘I am a Christian’ is not an identity statement. 
For my intellectual grasp upon what it is to be a 
Christian is weak, hermeneutical” (Ward 2000, 259).  
He even allows that God may be at work in extra-
ecclesial culture in such a way that the church may 
have to learn from its “cultural other” (Ward 2004, 
54). Yet, these are rare exceptions in Ward’s writing 
(with no clear parallels in Milbank’s own) which 
stand in stark contrast to the dominant and dogmatic 
assurances which structure the work of RO. It is 
Ward who insists that the church’s role is to bring 
“the world…to an understanding of itself” (96), that 
the church performs the “march of God in the 
world” (56), and that theology proceeds from a posi-
tion which is “transcultural and transhistorical” (56).  
This dominant voice can be heard even more clearly 
in Milbank, who makes no such occasional conces-
sions to the realm of “secular reason.”  On the con-
trary, as I have said, Ward and Milbank’s theological 
program is, in fact, constituted by numerous dual-
isms, not the least of which is that of “church” over 
against “culture.”  
Let me summarize what I hope to have achieved 
in the admittedly brief considerations to this point. 
First, I have attempted to highlight the fact that 
Ward and Milbank’s theological program is consti-
tutively dualistic, despite its claims to overcome the 
dualisms plaguing modern thought and theology.  
Second, I have highlighted how Tillich’s theology 
emerges from his desire to disrupt reigning dual-
isms, and does not represent a dualistic capitulation 
of theology to “secular reason.” Third, I have con-
trasted the respective shapes these theological pro-
posals take with regard to the relation of “church” to 
“culture,” attempting to show that Tillich’s ecclesi-
ology calls this dualism into question while Ward 
and Milbank’s theological program reinforces it. 
Having said all of this, however, it will be clear 
to the learned scholars of Tillich gathered here that 
in my reading of Tillich I have pressed past his own 
formulations at various points, and this brings us to 
the brief outline of my own revisions of Tillich’s 
thought that I promised earlier. While I obviously 
find tremendous promise for a more thoroughly non-
dualistic theology in Tillich’s thought, I also have 
some deep-seated reservations about the adequacy of 
his theological model as it stands. Stated most di-
rectly, what I propose is a more deconstructive-
phenomenological appropriation of Tillich’s theol-
ogy. In line with this, I would contest Tillich’s as-
surance that the one non-symbolic statement con-
cerning God is that God is being-itself, which, as he 
notes, is the basis of his distinctive development of 
the analogia entis and the notion of religious sym-
bolism (cf. Tillich 1951, 238-239). While space does 
not permit to outline my reasons for being uncom-
fortable with the notion of “being-itself,” I can at 
least hint at a broad array of reasons by stating that I 
am uncomfortable with this formulation for essen-
tially the same reasons Derrida ultimately critiques 
Heidegger’s notion of the “gathering” of Being. 
What I would contest, then, are Tillich’s own 
theological assurances and a host of concepts that I 
think highlight them, which I think too readily lend 
themselves to renewed dualistic constructions. 
Among these are revelation as manifestation, the 
emphasis on “unambiguous life,” a certain under-
standing of idolatry, and the notion of “God in his 
abyssal nature” in contradistinction to God as given 
in the correlational relation. What I propose, in other 
words, is a more phenomenological, and therefore 
less ontological, appropriation of Tillich’s thought. 
Such an approach, as I understand it, would content 
itself with the givenness of phenomenal life without 
falling back upon the assurances provided by an ap-
peal to “being-itself.” If there is a sense in which 
Tillich’s theology remains, to borrow John Caputo’s 
term (cf. Caputo), a “strong theology,” what I envi-
sion is a significantly “weaker” theology. 
What remains, then, if we call into question the 
ontology accompanying and structuring Tillich’s 
theology? I would suggest that we can give a dis-
tinctly deconstructive-phenomenological reading to 
the notion of the “unconditional” in Tillich’s 
thought. Along these lines, what is experienced as 
“unconditional” is not the giving of “being-itself,” 
but the very non-ultimate character of our reality as 
it is normally constituted. The unconditional, on 
such a formulation, is not an ontological positivity, 
but the experience of the non-ultimacy and ultimate 
contingency of our ordinary structures and forms of 
life. This phenomenological negativity would neces-
sarily be given as something, this “something” being 
that which brings about the disruption (i.e., the un-
conditioned is still mediated only via the condi-
tioned). This phenomenological disruption, and its 
being figured in something which is a phenomenol-
ogical positivity, is, following Tillich, a form of our 
constituted reality’s “opening up” beyond itself.  
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But, even more than I think Tillich allows, such 
opening up is ultimately aleatory and unforeseeable.  
For example, Tillich has a tendency to accord a 
privilege to particular past Christian symbols which 
I think ultimately stands in marked tension to his 
emphasis on the possibility of symbols’ dying away 
(e.g. Tillich 1963, 123). I think that the aspects of 
Tillich’s thought I have highlighted in this paper 
press against the assurance that “historical and doc-
trinal symbols” that once meaningfully communi-
cated Christian revelation can be counted upon to 
continue to play that role, and so can ultimately de-
termine the present shape of symbolic mediation (to 
put this in his terms). The undecidability opened up 
by the contingent nature of symbols, upon which I 
think Tillich insists, pushes us past his own attempts 
to limit this effect.   
Finally, I would reserve a place for a modified 
Tillichian conception of idolatry. On this formula-
tion, idolatry would indeed have to do—as it does 
for Tillich—with the elevation of the conditional to 
the status of the unconditional. However, it would 
not have to do with failure to recognize being-itself 
as the only unconditional. Rather, on the deconstruc-
tive-phenomenological model I am proposing, 
“idolatry” would consist in elevating any aspect of 
our social and communal life to “unconditional” 
status, thereby insulating it from all destabilization, 
contestation, or critique. To avoid idolatry is to 
maintain a firm insistence on the contingency of so-
cial forms as such, thereby seeking to maintain the 
openness of the social to its own creative reformula-
tions.   
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Ultimate Concern and Postmodern 
Theology: Two Competing Legacies 
 
Daniel Miller 
 
Preliminary Considerations 
It is probably fair to say that Tillich’s notion of 
“ultimate concern” is the most widely known and  
 
referenced aspect of his thought (including both 
critical and affirmative references). With this in 
mind, I will only say a brief word or two about this 
concept, reserving the greater part of what follows 
for a consideration of two divergent “postmodern” 
theological legacies of this concept.  
We can begin with a brief consideration of the 
notion of ultimate concern as Tillich formulates it, 
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specifically highlighting some points to which we 
will return as we proceed. Most succinctly, Tillich 
writes that “the object of theology is what concerns 
us ultimately. Only those propositions are 
theological which deal with their object insofar as it 
can become a matter of ultimate concern for us” 
(Tillich 1951, 12). Crucially, the “object” of ultimate 
concern is not an “objectivity” (12). Rather, Tillich 
insists that that which correlates to ultimate concern 
is “not a ‘highest thing’ called ‘the absolute’ or ‘the 
unconditioned,’ about which we could argue in 
detached objectivity” and goes on to write that “for 
this reason we have avoided terms like ‘the 
ultimate,’ ‘the unconditioned,’ ‘the universal,’ ‘the 
infinite,’ and have spoken of ultimate, unconditional, 
total, infinite concern” (12). Concerning the total 
nature of this concern, Tillich writes that “no part of 
ourselves or of our world is excluded from it; there 
is no ‘place’ to flee from it.”  Concerning its infinity, 
he writes that “no moment of relaxation and rest is 
possible in the face of a religious concern which is 
ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite” (12).  
Contrary to a popular (academic) perception, 
Tillich does not claim anything so banal as that  
“religion” has simply to do with whatever we 
happen to invest with ultimate value. On the 
contrary, the “existential” and ontological aspects of 
ultimate concern are coordinated in his thought.  
Thus, while it is true that the existential state of 
being “ultimately concerned” is “universally 
human,” with the result that humans may elevate any 
number of things to the position of ultimate concern 
(Tillich 1957, 9), he nevertheless maintains that only 
God, understood as “being-itself,” is the proper 
correlate of ultimate concern (Tillich 1951, 235).  
God, understood as “being-itself,” is a not a being 
(235) (and therefore cannot properly be said to 
“exist” (236)) but is the “creative and abysmal 
ground of being” (238). God is the infinite source of 
being in which everything that is, participates, in a 
merely finite way, for its being (237). While humans 
may therefore elevate something other than “being-
itself” to the position of ultimate concern, such 
elevation replaces ultimate concern with one which 
is in reality only “preliminary” (11-12), and is 
therefore idolatrous (13).  
 
Two Postmodern Legacies of “Ultimate Concern” 
Questions have arisen, for some time, about the 
relevance of Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern for 
so-called postmodern theology.1 What I want to 
suggest today is that two significant, and in most 
respects opposed, postmodern theological legacies of 
Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern are represented 
in the “Radical Orthodoxy” of Graham Ward and 
John Milbank, on the one hand, and in the “theology 
of the event” outlined by John Caputo, on the other.  
At first glance, both of these might seem like 
unlikely examples, given that neither Radical 
Orthodoxy nor Caputo provide any detailed 
treatment of Tillich’s thought in their published 
corpus.  As I hope to demonstrate, however briefly, 
it nevertheless remains the case that Tillich’s 
thought has had a significant influence on both 
Radical Orthodoxy and Caputo. 
 
Radical Orthodoxy and Ultimate Concern 
To say that Tillich does not often appear as a 
subject of explicit thematization in the work of 
Milbank and Ward is not to say that Tillich does not 
loom large in their thought.  On the contrary, Tillich 
is the image par excellence of all that is wrong with 
modern theology from their perspective. On the first 
page of his Theology and Social Theory, Milbank 
famously lays out the dilemma facing Christian 
theology in the postmodern context as he sees it: 
either theology will again become a “metadiscourse” 
positioning all other discourses, or it will be 
“positioned by secular reason” and “turn[ed] into the 
oracular voice of some finite idol, such as historical 
scholarship, humanist psychology, or transcendental 
philosophy” (Milbank 2006, 1). The danger to which 
modern theology has succumbed is nothing less than 
“its false humility” (1) in the face of the onslaught of 
“secular reason.” As metadiscourse, by way of 
contrast, theology must (once again) frame all other 
disciplines, or, as Milbank writes with Ward and 
Catherine Pickstock, “these disciplines will define a 
zone apart from God, grounded literally in nothing” 
(Milbank et. al., 3). The now-famous opposition of 
Radical Orthodoxy is clear: either a “radically 
orthodox” Christian theology, by which Ward and 
Milbank mean their own neo-Platonic, neo-
Aristotelian, Anglo-Catholic metaphysical theology, 
or nihilism.   
I will return to the significance of Ward and 
Milbank’s stark “either/or” logic shortly. For the 
moment, I want to point out that readers uninitiated 
with Ward and Milbank’s thought could be forgiven 
if it might seem as if Tillich would prove a useful 
ally for Radical Orthodoxy. Indeed, a number of 
themes in his own theological proposal would seem 
to form natural points of productive contact with 
those found in Radical Orthodoxy. His insistence on 
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what can only be viewed, from our contemporary 
perspective, as a robustly ontological and 
metaphysical understanding of God as “being-itself” 
marks an immediately evident point of similarity 
with Radical Orthodoxy, as does his insistence that 
all authentic being is such only through participation 
in the divine (the respective theologies of Tillich and 
Radical Orthodoxy, in other words, are both 
articulated around an analogy of being). Tillich’s 
attempt to provide a theology of culture would also 
seem to have obvious resonances with Ward, insofar 
as the latter is concerned to articulate Radical 
Orthodoxy as a broader theology of culture (an 
interest far less pronounced in Milbank). Again, 
from a contemporary perspective, one of the 
criticisms of Tillich’s theology of culture might be 
precisely that it remains too Christian in an exclusive 
sense, despite his own efforts to open Christian 
theology beyond itself. Stated differently, Tillich 
shares with Radical Orthodoxy an abiding concern 
to remain on guard against idolatry. In summary, 
then, we can read Tillich (though I don’t think we 
have to) as seeking to elevate theology to the level of 
“metadiscourse” of the kind advocated by Radical 
Orthodoxy, situating and positioning all other forms 
of knowledge, even if it must also be informed by 
them—a concern which echoes Ward in his most 
charitable moments. 
Given such inviting points of rapprochement, 
the actual response of radically-orthodox thinkers to 
Tillich is striking. Succinctly stated, Radical 
Orthodoxy finds in Tillich’s notion of ultimate 
concern a capitulation to “secular reason” and 
philosophy understood as a “zone apart from God,” 
and so as emblematic of the nihilism believed to 
infect modern theology. James K. A. Smith nicely 
summarizes the radically-orthodox reading of Tillich 
when he writes that “for Tillich, the claims of 
Christian revelation simply confirm the more 
universal disclosure of our dependence on the 
‘ground of being’” (Smith 36). Tillich is, for Radical 
Orthodoxy, the paradigm of what Milbank describes 
as the surrender of modern theology to philosophy, 
according the latter, in his words, “its own 
legitimacy, its own autonomy, apart from faith” 
(Milbank 1990, 21), with the result that the 
“knowledge of God” can only be articulated “in 
terms of philosophically derived categories of being 
and knowing, the legitimacy of which liberal 
theology has forfeited the right to adjudicate” (21).  
Tillich’s theology represents, as Ward writes in a 
critical review of Caputo’s Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida, a “faith without content” (Ward 
1999, 506). He finds in Tillich’s concern for “the 
ultimate” an appeal to a supposed universality which 
abstracts from all theological specificity, ultimately 
leading to the “liquidation of religion” (Ward 2003; 
115, 119), definitive of late-capitalist society.   
It would be easy to demonstrate that such 
readings represent “straw-man” Tillichs (we have 
already seen, for example, that Tillich explicitly 
rejects any formulation of ultimate concern in the 
objectivist terms of “the ultimate” attributed to him 
by Ward).  What I want to highlight here, however, 
is the function of such obviously caricatured 
presentations of Tillich in radically-orthodox 
thought. Simply stated, Radical Orthodoxy needs the 
caricatured Tillich. I fully endorse Virginia Burrus’s 
suggestion that Radical Orthodoxy represents a 
striking contemporary example of a heresiology. As 
she notes, “orthodoxy enters the stage of history 
hand in hand with heresiology,” the former being 
impossible or unnecessary without the latter (Burrus 
36). While orthodoxy presents itself as a 
(re)articulation of Christian truth undertaken in re-
sponse to, and so subsequent to, heresiological error, 
Burrus draws our attention to the fact that “in prac-
tice orthodoxy and heresy must always be spoken in 
the same breath, at the same time…” that “there is 
no orthodoxy without heresy…no original without 
mimicry” (37). My contention is that what holds for 
orthodoxy holds equally well for “Radical Ortho-
doxy.” Ward and Milbank’s entire theological pro-
gram is structured around the notion that late-
medieval nominalism initiated a death spiral for 
Western theology and philosophy, culminating in the 
nihilism and capitalist depravity of contemporary 
culture. 
This narrative (which takes a strikingly teleo-
logical form in Ward and Milbank’s thought, despite 
their criticism that it renders all historical develop-
ment merely “arbitrary”) legitimates the stark “ei-
ther/or” structuring their theological proposal.  
Without this sharp “either/or” alternative, they have 
no positive theological proposal of their own. It is 
not surprising, then, that Ward and Milbank have a 
vested interest in positioning Tillich as they do, pre-
cisely in an effort to occlude the obvious points of 
correlation (I term I use intentionally) between their 
own theological proposal and that of Tillich. In other 
words, were someone to successfully demonstrate 
that the “radical” points Ward and Milbank claim to 
introduce into contemporary theology were already 
there in Tillich, their theological program would be 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 39, no. 2, Spring 2013 
 
32 
decisively called into question. Modern theology 
would no longer represent the nihilistic, vacuous 
“other” against which Radical Orthodoxy defines 
itself. Insofar as Radical Orthodoxy positively de-
pends on the very “Tillich” it rejects, I am suggest-
ing that it, in fact, represents one, albeit negative, 
postmodern legacy of Tillich’s notion of ultimate 
concern.  
 
Caputo and Ultimate Concern 
If Radical Orthodoxy represents a negative leg-
acy coming out of Tillich’s notion of ultimate con-
cern, John Caputo’s recent work represents a much 
more positive and affirmative, though still critical, 
legacy of Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern. Re-
sponding to a series of papers on Tillich presented in 
the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Cul-
ture” Group at the 2005 annual meeting of the 
American Academy of Religion, Caputo notes that, 
though it has gone “largely unexpressed” in his writ-
ten work, he has always had a love of Tillich 
(Caputo 2005, 1). He goes on to suggest that his 
then-recently-published Weakness of God and the 
“theology of the event” it outlines (that is the subtitle 
of the book) bears the stamp of Tillich. Caputo’s 
professed “affection” for Tillich has become more 
pronounced in some of his most recent work (1). 
One of Caputo’s recent concerns has been to outline 
and contrast what he sees as two forms of postmod-
ern (Continental) philosophy of religion. In his view, 
the first, broadly Kantian, model takes “postmodern-
ism” to be, as he puts it, “a way to delimit knowl-
edge in order to make room for a more [or] less clas-
sical orthodox faith” (Caputo 2011c, 1). Caputo con-
trasts this first, “mostly apologetic,” approach with 
what he describes as his own “theopoetic” approach 
(1). Tillich enters into the picture at this point: 
Caputo suggests in numerous instances that this al-
ternative model of postmodern philosophy (which he 
also terms a “radical theology” (3; cf. 2011a 24; 
2011b)) has Hegel for its grandfather and Tillich as 
its father (2011b, 22; 2011c, 5). Despite a lack of 
sustained treatment of Tillich, then, Caputo ac-
knowledges Tillich as an essential precursor (though 
certainly not the only or, I would suggest, the pri-
mary one) of his current project in radical theology, 
theopoetics, or philosophy of religion, all descriptors 
of his work.  
Caputo is explicit in tracing the “fatherhood” of 
Tillich to the notion of ultimate concern, which he 
seeks to rearticulate in a number of critical ways.  
Specifically, he seeks to articulate in Tillich’s notion 
of ultimate concern not in terms of being-itself, but 
in terms of what he describes as “a phenomenology, 
albeit of a post-Husserlian, radical, or deconstructive 
variety” (2011c, 1), a “heretical and hauntological 
quasi-phenomenology” (7). Caputo’s is a decon-
structive phenomenology that aims to “make room 
for the open-ended unpredictability [of] something 
deeply aleatory and non-programmable that keeps 
the future open” (2005, 4). 
Caputo’s emphasis on the aleatory nature of this 
phenomenological structure marks the point where 
he is both nearest and farthest from Tillich. Caputo 
aims at the aleatory and non-programmable futurity 
described in his phenomenological approach with 
the notion of “the event,” which he develops from 
the thought of both Derrida and Deleuze. He writes 
that “the event is an event of desire, not the 
determinate and determinable desires that I can pick 
out and identify…but what is going on in that desire, 
which I designate by speaking of a desire beyond 
desire” (2011c, 9). The echoes of Tillich in this 
formulation are both clearly discernible and explicit 
on his thought. Caputo tells us in The Weakness of 
God that it is the event which “concerns us 
ultimately” (2006, 294). His aleatory “desire beyond 
desire” is the correlate of ultimate concern, 
rendering all determinate desires merely 
“preliminary” in Tillich’s sense of the term. The 
event is that which is unconditioned insofar as it is 
“undeconstructible” (340n24).  
But if Caputo is explicit in acknowledging his 
proximity to Tillich, he is equally clear concerning 
his distance. Tillich’s overall thought ultimately 
remains, in Caputo’s estimation, “too centered on an 
underlying logos” which preserves a “profound 
equilibrium” (2005, 4) only at the cost of the 
aleatory futurity of the event. He therefore seeks to 
de-couple the “existential” aspect of Tillich’s 
thought from the ontological anchoring Tillich 
provides for it, joining with other “postmodern” 
thinkers (e.g., Winquist) in registering a suspicion of 
Tillich’s appeal to being, non-being, and his 
insistence on the non-symbolic nature of the 
definition of God as “being-itself” (1). While he 
applauds Tillich’s incorporation of a Schellingian 
notion of Ungrund into his theological proposal, 
Caputo remains critical of what he sees as Tillich’s 
refusal to give this notion of Ungrund a freer reign 
in his thought (4).2 As he puts it, “for the Ungrund to 
have any teeth in it, it would mean an indeterminacy, 
unregulability, unpredictability, unprogrammability 
inscribed in the [‘]things themselves[‘]” (the latter 
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phrase bringing us back to the phenomenological 
dimension of Caputo’s theopoetic proposal) (4). He 
finds in Tillich’s insistence on the non-symbolic 
nature of the proposition that God is being-itself an 
attempt to regulate the Ungrund that inhabits his 
formulation (cf. 1). Or, stating the issue in terms of 
Caputo’s proposal, Tillich ultimate seeks to regulate, 
and so to foreclose upon, the aleatory futurity of the 
event. 
If Ward and Milbank hold Tillich in contempt 
for evacuating faith of identifiable Christian content 
(a charge which I think is unfair), Caputo is critical 
of Tillich for settling for faith in an ultimate concern 
that remains all too determinate. As he sums up the 
issue: “I am spicing up Tillich with a little dash of 
deconstruction: in the desire for God, for the uncon-
ditional event, there is no identifiable ultimate con-
cern, for that identification would immediately turn 
the gold of ultimacy into the lead of something 
proximate, thereby locking the even inside a name 
and confining the unconditional to something condi-
tioned” (2006, 340n24). 
 
Evaluating the Legacies 
I conclude by suggesting, very briefly, that 
Caputo’s legacy ultimately holds more promise than 
that of Radical Orthodoxy. Simply stated, Radical 
Orthodoxy is, despite all of its protestations to the 
contrary, reactive, nostalgic, and dualistic. Indeed, 
there is something positively Shakespearian about 
the repeated radically-orthodox insistence that it 
does not represent a form of premodern or medieval 
nostalgia (Radical Orthodoxy doth protest too 
much…). In my view, the deal is sealed by the here-
siological structure of radically-orthodox thought, 
outlined above. As I have already noted, the entire 
radically-orthodox theological edifice (and I have in 
mind both Ward and Milbank) is structured around 
the argument that acids of heresy have slowly been 
eating away at the church and its theology since the 
late medieval period, and that now, in the present, 
nihilistic moment, this has come clearly into view.  
While there are certainly some novel, constructive, 
and even positive elements of radically-orthodox 
thought, I remain unconvinced by arguments that the 
overall narrative advance in Radical Orthodoxy rep-
resents more than a call for a return to an earlier 
time, a call to “reset the clock” on Western culture.  
I don’t know how else to read Milbank’s insistence, 
to give one example, that his positively utopian ac-
count of life in medieval Christendom is, in his 
words, “presented as a debatable account of actual 
real history” (2006, XXI) or Ward’s insistence that 
the relation between God and society is irreducibly 
“theocratic” or “aristocratic” (2009, 299). 
By way of contrast, Caputo’s theopoetics, his 
“weak theology,” holds greater promise. He con-
trasts his position with more apologetic approaches 
to postmodern theology, suggesting that determinate 
religious traditions are the “multiple horizons” 
(2011c, 2) which “nominate and actualize” (3) the 
phenomenological structure. For him, each such tra-
dition has its own vitality, and therefore its own 
“truth,” but no tradition can be final, ultimate, or 
claim to be the “Truth” (with a capital “T”) insofar 
as each tradition represents a conditioned response 
to the unconditioned aleatory future that, while sus-
taining it, also threatens it, opening its own contin-
gency. Caputo therefore advocates what he calls a 
“hermeneutics of universality” (4) attending to that 
aleatory phenomenological structure that exceeds 
(but does not simply abstract from, as his critics 
suppose) the limits imposed by any concrete histori-
cal form.   
The promise—and the threat—of Caputo’s ap-
proach, then, is that it resolutely looks forward into 
an open future, whereas Ward and Milbank’s Radi-
cal Orthodoxy looks back nostalgically to a past that 
never was. Or stated in what I think are more phe-
nomenological terms, while Caputo’s thought opens 
onto a true future, the eschatological future to which 
Ward and Milbank gesture is merely a repetition 
(albeit intensified to “infinity”) of an idealized past. 
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1 While I realize that a term like “postmodern theol-
ogy” is deserving of further elaboration, space simply 
does not permit us to address the issue here.  For the time 
being, we might define delimit “postmodern” theology as 
including those forms of theology which articulate their 
theological proposals in opposition to “ontotheology.”  
This working definition is particularly appropriate for 
discussing Tillich in relation to postmodern theology, 
insofar as the concern of “postmodern” theological has 
been whether or not, or the degree to which, Tillich’s 
thought remains beholden to ontotheology.  As examples 
of this concern at work, compare Charles Winquist’s 
statement that “Tillich is not a postmodern theologian. He 
clearly works within the ontotheological tradition” (Win-
quist 62) with John Thatamanil’s defense of a non-
ontotheological interpretation of Tillich’s notion of “be-
ing-itself” (Thatamanil 293ff.) 
2 Caputo is responding here to John Thatamanil, who 
emphasized the role of the Ungrund in Tillich’s thought 
in his own paper presented in the Tillich section of the 
2005 annual meeting of the American Academy of Relig-
ion. On this point, cf. Thatamanil 2008. 
 
 
Mary Daly and the Patriarch with 
Good Ideas 
 
Christopher D. Rodkey 
 
Feminist philosopher and theologian Mary Daly 
describes her overarching theological methodol-
ogy—despite her disdain for methodologies as 
“methdologicide”—as “Piracy.”  Among all of those 
influential on her thought—Aquinas, Jacques 
Maritain, Simone de Beauvoir, Nelle Morton, Susan 
Griffin, Matilda Joslyn Gage, Nietzsche, and the  
 
death of God theologians—Paul Tillich has the most 
enduring and significant impact on Daly.1 As a “Pi-
rate” and “Alchemist,” Daly gives these figures 
some credit but acknowledges that she often appro-
priates and mis-appropriates their ideas for her own 
playful usage. A “Call to Piracy” for Daly is to 
poach and “accumulate” such intellectual “treasures 
of knowledge that had been hidden from my Tribe.”  
Although Daly simultaneously exhibits a disdain and 
respect for Tillich, she engages no other thinker so 
directly throughout her writing.  She refers to Tillich 
in both Outercourse and Quintessence as a thinker 
“used” as a “spring-board.”2 In doing so, Laurel 
Schneider suggests, Daly has initiated “a profound 
and invaluable critique of the limitations and distor-
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tions embedded in his thinking.”3 While teaching at 
the now-defunct Cardinal Cushing College in 
Brookline, Massachusetts, Daly audited courses with 
Paul Tillich at Harvard Divinity School. She writes 
of this experience: “I sat at the back of the Sperry 
Room where Tillich lectured. He had a powerful 
charisma but there was something about it that I did 
not like…. But it was important that I saw and heard 
Tillich in person—that my knowledge was not con-
fined to his books.” Daly would write further that 
she felt Tillich’s “ghost” later when she herself 
would return to Harvard to lecture in the same 
room.4 Even though, as Daly admits in Pure Lust 
years later, Tillich’s “vast scope and vigor of his 
thought….[i]s worth studying and criticizing by 
those who would embark upon the adventure of dis-
covering Elemental philosophy,” Tillich is not to be 
altogether trusted; instead, his ideas should only be 
used “as springboards for our own original analy-
sis.”5 She adds in a 1972 article that “Tillich’s in-
sights…are very helpful” for the cause of women’s 
liberation, and thus “[h]is work provides a theoreti-
cal” groundwork “which can be extended and ap-
plied.”6  
Daly’s most important and central criticism of 
Tillich is that his systematic understanding of the 
power of being for self-transcendence is not radical 
enough. Once one transcends oneself in Tillich’s 
theology, Daly suggests in Gyn/Ecology, “[t]here is 
no reason to change and no possibility of changing, 
only of wallowing.” Self-transcendence must be 
perpetually unfolding and truly radical for it to be 
“self-affirming” in the way that Tillich believes that 
it is. While this is not necessarily how Tillich pre-
sents the nature of the power of being in his theol-
ogy, Daly sees the centrality of Christology and Til-
lich’s own personal life as examples of a life errone-
ously self-affirmed. Regarding Tillich’s sexual ad-
dictions, Daly suggests Paul Tillich exhibited the 
kind of “religious doublethink” of “mythic/ theo-
logical self-deception” that manifests itself, reverses 
itself, as “self-acceptance.”7 She adds, such “sado-
masochistic” reversals “are the juice/sap of his im-
pressive theologizing.”8 
While Daly writes in Gyn/Ecology that Tillich 
“deceives us with statements that are both true and 
untrue at the same time,” she refers to him in her 
earlier writing, in The Church and the Second Sex, 
as a “prophetic figure.”9 In Daly’s later work, Til-
lich’s influence has—intriguingly—become even 
more apparent, though he is discussed and credited 
far less. Wanda Berry suggests that Tillich’s influ-
ence is not only a formal influence upon on Daly’s 
writing, but that Tillich’s influence “was both con-
scious and unconscious.”10 
 
Tillichian Symbology 
 
The two scholars who have written the most 
about the intellectual relationships between Tillich 
and Daly are Laurel Schneider and Mary Ann Sten-
ger. I will summarize their arguments, but they both 
point primarily toward the same salient notion: Til-
lich’s notion of the religious symbol undergirds the 
whole of Daly’s work in the same way that the idea 
operates within Tillich’s theological system. To re-
view, for Tillich the religious symbol is rooted in the 
ultimate and points toward being-itself inasmuch as 
it participates in esse-ipsum.  
Mary Ann Stenger was the first to investigate 
Tillich’s influence upon Daly, writing the first such 
article in Encounter in 1982, well before Daly’s 
ideas become more developed in Pure Lust and later 
writings.11 According to Stenger, Daly pirates Til-
lich’s theology of culture. The correlative function 
of a Tillichian theology of culture shifts away from 
Tillich’s choice of culture—art, architecture, poli-
tics—and directly shifts toward women’s experience 
of patriarchy.12 As such, Stenger suggests, Daly’s 
theology is formally Tillichian, complete with 
nearly-matching concepts. Instead of kairos as “a 
fulfilled and creative movement of time and time of 
decision,” for Daly a kairos is collapsed into her ap-
propriated notion of an Eternal Now. For Daly, 
“Now is a kairos,” despite the fact that Daly would 
never use such blatantly Christian terminology.13   
Laurel Schneider rejects Stenger’s argument that 
Daly has merely appropriated or, to use Stenger’s 
term, simply “reinterpreted,” Tillich’s method of 
correlation.14  In fact, Schneider suggests that Daly’s 
apprehension of methodology as “methodolatry” or 
“methodicide” is closely connected to Tillich’s own 
obsession with theological method. Instead, for Daly 
the methodology is a “movement” from one New 
Creation or Spiraling Galaxy to another. Schneider 
points toward a short phrase found early in Beyond 
God the Father that calls this movement methodol-
ogy as a “method of liberation.”15 Recalling that 
Daly’s charge that Tillich’s notion of self-
transcendence as self-affirmation is not radical 
enough, or that a correlative methodology must be 
radical, Schneider suggests that the two do have 
some methodological solidarity. She writes:   
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Tillich sees an anthropocentric ‘New Being,’ 
Daly a biophilic cosmic one, but both see of a 
culture a source and resource for revelation. 
What is revealed turns out to be rather different, 
depending on whether the presupposition is 
christocentric or biophilic-feminist….I suggest 
that neither truly starts with analysis of culture 
and ends with theological answers. Both have 
answers in mind when they ask the question, and 
both presuppose a path of hope for those who 
perceive the anxieties/oppressors of contempo-
rary life, namely systematic New be-
ing/elemental Metabe-ing.”16 
Even though Daly is by most definitions a theo-
logian, she usually refers to herself as a philosopher.  
Her autobiographical Outercourse constantly refers 
to her Journey as one closed off to a formal educa-
tion in Western philosophy, so that she inevitably 
developed her own replacement for it. Tillich, too, 
redefined the Western intellectual tradition when-
ever it was convenient, reinvented new words, and 
cleverly pointed questions that often assumed the 
answers in the question. Like Tillich, Daly “works 
on the boundary between philosophy and theol-
ogy.”17 For Tillich, the unavoidable reality on that 
boundary is Christ, for Daly, it is “biophilic be-ing.” 
“Boundary Living” for Daly is to “realize the 
power of Presence on the Boundaries of patriarchal 
institutions,” which would certainly include Western 
philosophy and theology for the radical feminist 
thinker.18 But this boundary between the two is of 
particular importance to Daly. In Pure Lust, Daly 
quotes Tillich, from the first volume of the System-
atic Theology: 
While reason in the sense of Logos determines 
the ends and only the second place the means, 
reason in the technical sense determines the 
means while accepting the ends from “some-
where else.” There is no danger in this situation 
as long as technical reason is the companion of 
ontological reason and “reasoning” is used to 
fulfill the demands of reason. This situation pre-
vailed in most pre-philosophical as well as phi-
losophical periods of human history, although 
there always was the threat that “reasoning” 
might separate itself from reason. Since the 
middle of the nineteenth century this threat has 
become a dominating reality. The consequence 
is that the ends are provided by nonrational 
forces, either by positive traditions, or by arbi-
trary decisions serving the will to power.19  
To which Daly responds: 
This passage is a typically Tillichean blend of 
important insights, confusions, and astonishing 
subliminal embed. One would not wish to dis-
agree offhand with the idea that technical reason 
(“reasoning”) should receive its ends from onto-
logical reason.  But Tillich’s use of language—
of symbols—carries the reader to strange con-
clusions/confusions. Referring to technical rea-
son as the “companion” of ontological reason, 
he is appalled that the former has separated itself 
(herself?) from the latter, rather that fulfilling 
“its” (his?) demands—a situation which it (she?) 
had threatened to bring about for many centu-
ries. Tillich thus depicts technical reason as a 
sort of wayward wife who refused to meet the 
demands of her lord and master and finally not 
only threatened but actually obtained a di-
vorce—in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Writing with laughter (“Be-Laughing”), Daly 
notes that this divorce actually pre-dates the medie-
val period and “grotesquely manifested in the writ-
ings of Descartes in the early seventeenth century.”  
According to Daly, Tillich’s insight is precisely the 
point that he missed, namely, that philosophy and 
theology, as the “handmaiden,” in its traditional 
conception, resembles many of the same qualities of 
a “typical patriarchal marriage, in which the unruly 
wife/subordinate has a disconcerting ability to dis-
obey and run away.”20 
For Tillich, “religious symbols are double-
edged,” and are always inadequate, but are nonethe-
less sometimes helpful, and more often are rooted in 
non-being than in being.21 Daly writes in Pure Lust, 
referring to Tillich’s discussion of symbols in the 
first volume of the Systematic Theology: “Sym-
bols…participate in that to which they point. They 
open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and 
they unlock dimensions and elements of our souls 
that correspond to these hidden dimensions and ele-
ments of reality. As Tillich pointed out, they cannot 
be artificially produced, but rather grow out of the 
unconscious.”22 The problem with Tillich, from 
Daly’s perspective, is that while Tillich would ac-
knowledge that patriarchal symbols are not literal 
expressions of God and are in fact part of the sym-
bols’ inadequacies, he “stops short of offering a cri-
tique of the appropriateness of kinghood as a symbol 
for God,” even if his line of thinking directly points 
toward identifying the tremendous problems which 
spirate out of such symbols.23 As Susann Pangerl 
states, “Tillich’s ontological analysis falls short” in 
connecting “sexism, and its concrete manifestations 
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for interpersonal relationships and for the individual 
psyche,” as well as long-term effects of gendered 
religious symbols; these issues “remained outside 
his scope of inquiry.”24 
While Daly might agree with Tillich’s assess-
ment of how symbols work, again, Daly charges that 
Tillich does not go far enough with his own thinking 
or even follow his ideas to their conclusions. Til-
lich’s understanding of symbols is that when they 
point toward what he believes to be being-itself, 
esse-ipsum, symbols cannot be all bad, even if they 
are dangerous, such as a regal symbol for God. He 
assumes that there is an undergirding telos of sym-
bols aligned with esse-ipsum, a group of “fixed and 
limited” that appears as a “set” to Tillich.25 These 
symbols “are understood to represent eternal truths; 
the truth value of the theological symbols looks 
backward toward history and tradition” rather than 
“an evolving sense of truth as something not yet 
having been.”26 For Daly, esse-ipsum is “detached” 
and “abstract”: a static symbology that points toward 
a necrophilial reality.27 Daly instead suggests a shift 
toward a Verbal esse, rather than a nominative esse-
ipsum, which is “the Verb”: The Verb of Verbs in 
her classic book, Beyond God the Father.  
 
Courage, Quintessence, and Ontological Intuition 
 
Perhaps the most obvious act of Piracy enacted 
by Daly on Tillich’s thought is her poaching/Pirating 
of his notion of existential courage. Just as Daly 
criticized Tillich on other elements of his theology, 
she charges once again that Tillich did not go far 
enough in his understanding of courage. More spe-
cifically, the patriarchal impulse unconsciously at 
work in Tillich’s thought as a Christian theologian 
prevented him from taking his good ideas to their 
logical ends. Daly writes in Outercourse: “The idea 
of existential courage was initially inspired by Paul 
Tillich’s book, The Courage to Be. However…I took 
it into another context, that is, the context of the om-
nipresent sexual caste system of patriarchy, and ap-
plied it to the struggle to see through the basic/base 
assumptions of sexual hierarchy in theology and in 
popular culture. So the concept of existential cour-
age was radically transformed. Tillich became the 
target of my criticism for encouraging detachment 
from the reality of the struggle against oppression in 
concrete manifestations.”28 
In Pure Lust, Daly calls this detached courage 
“potted courage,” as static and ultimately 
hegemonic, as not perpetually becoming. This potted 
courage can be present in Christian, non-Christian, 
or atheistic philosophical or theological settings.  
She explains, using Tillich as an example: 
Theologian Paul Tillich…maintains that ‘the 
courage to be’ transcends the fortitude that is 
concerned only with specific fears, and that it 
confronts existential anxiety of nonbeing. How-
ever, patriarchal theological/philosophical 
analysis of anxiety has no way to Name ade-
quately the specific structures of ‘nonbeing’—
mythic, ideological, or societal. It therefore can-
not fully Name the way past these, which is the 
Elemental Realizing of participation in Metabe-
ing. In other words, patriarchally named existen-
tial courage is described as ‘affirming being over 
against nonbeing,’ and this is all it can do. It can 
only affirm one reified opposite over against an-
other, but it cannot re-member the metapatriar-
chal Elemental intuition of be-ing. Thus, the 
nebulous nothingness called “nonbeing” looms 
larger than life. 29 
For Daly, then, Tillichian courage is an authentic 
ontological courage, but it does not open the means 
for a truly dynamic self-transcending reality; instead 
it points toward a more singular self-
transcendence.30 As such, Tillich’s conception of 
courage rejects the dynamism that is potent in the 
local “I.” To have the “Courage to See,” she writes, 
is a situation where the self recognizes “the unsee-
ing—indeed eyeless—existential courage of Tillich 
[to be] I-less for women.”31 
Daly’s Elemental Courage is ontological and 
Elemental; it requires subversive transgression and 
the ability to accept and love oneself.32 It requires an 
acknowledgement of différance by virtue of the 
rootedness of Courage in Metabeing.  It is also con-
nected to the vita-ipsum, the life-itslf that is Elemen-
tal, because we have an “intuition of be-ing.”   
Daly names several different kinds of ontologi-
cal, Elemental courage, and defines them in the 
Wickedary:  Ontological Courage, Outrageous Cour-
age, the Courage to Leave, Courage to Live, Cour-
age to See, and the Courage to Sin.33 The Courage to 
Sin is later called “The Courage to Sin Originally,” 
“The Courage to Sin/Spin,” and finally the “Courage 
to Sin Big.”34 She elsewhere also mentions the 
Courage to Be, to Grieve, to Rage, to Laugh out 
Loud, and to Create.35 In all of these different kinds 
of ontological/Elemental Courage, the courageous-
ness is always subversive as “Outrageous Courage,” 
which risks the charge of “tastelessness” but moves 
toward “reversing the reigning reversals” of patriar-
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chy.36 The false empowerment offered by patriarchal 
sado-spirituality is called dis-couraging.37 
The emotion (“E-motion”) of Rage is often es-
sential for the Motion required for Elemental Cour-
age. Rage is not negative but it is the praxis of 
Courage.38 Rage is “not something to be gotten 
over,” Daly writes, “[i]t is a transformative, focusing 
Force.” Rage is creative: “As the ocean roars its 
rhythms into every creature, giving birth to sensa-
tions of our common Sources/Courses, Rage too, 
makes senses come alive again, thrive again….The 
sounds of its pounding awaken transcendent E-
motion.”39 She writes elsewhere that Courage is to 
also “risk economic and social security for the sake 
of liberation,” as well as “risking the loss of jobs, 
friends, and social approval,” and to face “the name-
less anxieties encountered in new and uncharted ter-
ritory.” This is best accomplished in the community 
of “sisterhood,” and when women courageously live 
and act, “[s]isterhood is a revolutionary act.”40 Debra 
Campbell writes that for Daly “[e]ven if Ontological 
Courage sounds like an abstraction, there is nothing 
abstract about living a life grounded in Ontological 
Courage.”41 It is an acknowledgement that we live 
life as a life among other Elements, including others, 
animals, plants, and the earth. 
To this end, Daly’s notion of the Courage to Sin 
is of some particular significance as the courage to 
live life. Early in Pure Lust the Courage to Sin is 
directly connected to the process of self-
transcendence, of “Realizing be-ing.” Later, she ex-
plains that women throughout history have been em-
phatically “WRONG according to prevailing assump-
tions” of the patriarchy “may be said to Sin.” Since 
“the word sin is probably etymologically akin to the 
Latin est, meaning (s)he is, and that it is derived 
from the Indo-European root es-, meaning to be,” 
then Courage, that is, “our courage to be,’ must im-
ply “the courage to be WRONG.” In other words, 
“Elemental be-ing is Sinning; it requires the Courage 
to Sin.” She explains further: 
To Sin against the society of sado-sublimation 
is to be intellectual in the most direct and daring 
way, claiming and trusting the deep correspon-
dence between the structures/processes of one’s 
own mind and the structures/processes of reality.  
To Sin is to trust intuitions and the reasoning 
rooted in them.  To Sin is to come into the full-
ness of our powers, confronting now newly un-
derstood dimensions of the Battles of Principali-
ties and Powers.  
The Courage to Sin is to revolt and reverse pa-
triarchal pseudo-realities and to construct new 
ones. It “trusts the deep correspondence between 
the structures” and “processes of one’s own 
mind and the structures” and “processes of real-
ity”: understanding the différance between vitae-
ipsum and my own constructions and creations 
of reality.  Ultimately, to Sin is to Re-member to 
Live and love Life.42  It is to find meaning and 
value in life-itself; and to do this will always be 
a subversive activity, especially in a death-
loving patriarchal society.43 
While Daly would probably see herself on this 
point at her furthest distance from Tillich, while still 
using his Pirated ideas, the connection to sin and Sin 
reflects a very Tillichian anthropology. If we recall 
Tillich’s sermon, “The Good I Will, I Do Not,” Til-
lich memorably speaks of Sin—Sin in the singular 
with a capital “S”—Sin as a power controlling world 
and mind, persons and nations.” First, it is interest-
ing that Tillich shifts to a capitalized use of the word 
Sin here, Spelling perhaps without realizing the 
gravity with which a future interpreter such as Daly 
might methodologically associate such a shift.44  
Secondly, ironically, staying true to Protestant theo-
logical anthropology, to accept one’s own life as 
perpetually full of sin and grappling with Sin is a 
liberated, Christian life for Tillich. It is the means by 
which one “finds the courage to believe in a total 
acceptance of themselves,” to love themselves. 
A Dalyan reading of Tillich here suggests that 
Tillich in his sermon is partially unaware of just how 
his words expose deeper truths than he already in-
tended.  Clearly, for Tillich, we live in a sinful state.  
Daly would suggest that we do not live in a sinful 
(or “sin-fool”) state, but rather that we should live in 
a Sinful (Sin-full) state, that being Sinful is not a 
passive way of being-in-the-word. The small-letter-s 
sinful state is one imposed by a patriarchal religious 
system that defines sin with what its typically necro-
philial agendas and is not biophilic. Small-s sin is 
something to be avoided, in as much as it is un-
avoidable; it apprehends self-transcendence unless, 
according to Tillich, it is simply recognized and ac-
cepted. For Daly, to acknowledge is not enough, and 
to genuinely Name sin would be to reverse it. “Sin-
ful Courage,” she writes, “is furthered by the Pyro-
genetic Power of Naming, which itself is an expres-
sion of the Volcanic Virtue of Courage.”45 
Sinful Courage, then, as an active activity (rather 
than passive) requires one to have the Courage to 
Create. The phrase “Courage to Create” is taken 
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from Tillich’s friend, Rollo May, who, in a book 
titled The Courage to Create poses human creativity 
as something that “provokes the jealously of the 
gods.”46 Calling such thinking laughable, Daly sug-
gests that Godly jealousy has its origins in men’s 
deficiency to give birth themselves. The “Leap-
ing/Expanding” of self-transcendence, Daly writes, 
“requires Ontological Courage, which manifests it-
self as the Courage to Create—to summon out of the 
apparent void New Be-ing,” to “push back the fore-
ground, the nonbeing pompously parading as Be-
ing.” This Spinning and Weaving subversively 
against the nothing of patriarchy sees this nothing-
ness as a new creatio ex nihilo—Courageously Cre-
ating out of the nothing.47 In an earlier work, she 
calls this Courageous Creativity “ontological becom-
ing,” which has “itself an alchemistic power” as 
“revolutionary and revelatory, revealing our partici-
pation in an ultimate reality as Verb, as intransitive 
Verb.”48 In her middle work, she calls the practice of 
living Courageously “Elemental Ontology” or even 
“Pyro-ontology.49 In her later writings, the state of 
living Courageousness is called “Quintessence,” 
which is living with “specific emphasis” on mani-
festing oneself “as a source of integrity, harmony, 
and luminous splendor of form.”  It is to render one-
self a “Goddess,” Courageously Creating and Spin-
ning new realities and in the process being in touch 
with one’s own spirit, becoming “more than ever 
like trees and angels,” that is to say, “[e]xtending our 
roots deeper, we are free to expand and participate in 
the universe.”50 
Quintessence is active, Raging, be-ing, but it is 
rooted in the ontological intuition potently intuitive 
in women. It is natural and self-affirming. Latent 
ontological intuition is at once the courage to love 
oneself and the courage to self-transcend, the cour-
age for a woman to “Discover Faith in herSelf” and 
Act by “Seeing and Breaking Out of bondage.” This 
is a “Spiraling process,” with both of these elements 
connected and always leading to a new awareness. 
Ontological intuition transgresses against any notion 
of a “Supreme Being” that “just hangs ‘up there.’”  
The Shock of be-ing, then, is a genuine shock of the 
ultimacy in the Now, in the clover just saying “I 
am.” Ontological intuition “Unblocks/Shocks” the 
“Blocks” of patriarchy, opening oneself to “the way 
for infinite possibilities” 51 
It is to this end that there are various expressions 
of this Quintessence punning on the Verb and the 
actions often associated with the Verb: Be-Dazzling, 
Be-Falling, Be-Friending, Be-Laughing, Be-
Longing, Be-Monstering, Be-Musing, Be-Shrewing, 
Be-Speaking, Be-Spelling, Be-Thinking, Be-Tiding, 
Be-Wildering, Be-Wishing, and Be-Witching.52  
Daly defines Be-Speaking as “Naming our intercon-
nectedness.”53 Be-Laughing, for example, is defined 
by Daly as a “Primal Act of Power.” Furthermore: It 
is breaking the Taboo against Elemental humor, 
which splits/cracks man-made “reality,” unveiling 
man’s mysteries. Be-Laughing is not mere reacting 
to patriarchy’s horrors. It is an activity that carries 
laughter in the Background. 
As Self-conscious Seers, Be-Laughing women 
are engaged in the Metamysterious work of Meta-
fooling…. In short, Metafooling is Outrageous Con-
tagious Departure from phallic fixations.  It consists 
of riotous transformations.54 Clearly, Be-Laughing is 
to have and act with a Courageous, subversive, hu-
mor about life.   
These words, prefixed by Be-, are for ontologi-
cal/Elemental Spells. They “Name the interconnect-
edness which involves Transtemporal/Trans-spatial 
Consciousness, Communication, Sisterhood, Syn-
chronicities, [and] Travels,” Daly writes, “[i]n other 
words, they signify active participation in the Har-
mony of the Universe.”55 They describe the com-
plexity and simplicity (the is-ing, the be-ing) of liv-
ing in Quintessence. Sometimes this is lived in soli-
tude but more often and preferably “in community 
with others.”56 
In shifting away from God-language to Verb-
talk, Daly has also shifted the tensions between tran-
scendence and immanence latent in Tillichian 
thought to be less about the nature of the universe 
but toward the nature of our perceptions about the 
universe. Daly critics Marilyn Frye and Sarah Hoa-
gland who write that this shift no longer defines 
“‘transcendent’ in the old sense of ‘outside’ or ‘be-
yond’ the world of our lives, but transcendent in a 
new sense—a way of be-ing that we participate in 
that is completely transformative.”57 After the Death 
of Daddydom, living in the time after the death of 
God, where the patriarchy has begun to be silenced, 
a Copernican shift is emerging toward the authentic, 
ontological/Elemental Creation and Naming latent in 
the Selves of the oppressed.58 The shift is onto what 
she called in an 1969 essay to live in “[t]he faith…of 
ultimate concern,” a religion of the concrete spirit 
where women may live more genuinely.59 To do so 
requires radical feminism to have the Courage to 
Leave, and to Courageously Live, in some respects, 
as an “exodus community.”60   
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A truly biophilic spirituality truly loves life as 
the highest value, subversively “living the process of 
transvaluing values” as a “revolutionary” being-in-
the-world.61 In doing so, Daly, as Anne-Marie Korte 
writes, “sings and associates, speaks in different 
voices, places herself outside any system, shows an-
ger, pleasure, and analytical depth, draws on and 
cites Western theology, philosophy, and mythology 
as well as contemporary culture; in so doing, she 
spins and weaves new tapestries of meaning.”62  
 Shifting away from Tillich’s method of correla-
tion to Spinning a Piracy of voices, sources, and 
ideas, Daly has Alchemically Conjured a new phi-
losophy through her linguistic Spellings.63 This radi-
cal shift, however, subversively begins in Tillich’s 
thought. Instead of rearranging and realigning Chris-
tian theology, as Tillich did with his method of cor-
relation, Daly’s Piracy not only “recalibrates” a new 
theology or philosophy but also offers an apocalyp-
tic vision of “a new configuration of society itself.”64 
Although Daly ultimately rejects Tillich as a “phal-
locratic…springboard,” clearly, for Daly, as Laurel 
Schneider puts it, “Tillich opens the door” for a radi-
cal feminist spirituality, and “Daly takes the lead.”65 
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